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This thesis analyzes foreign investment in ports, assets and physical spaces that hold 
great strategic importance politically and economically at the national level and on a 
global scale. In particular, the thesis focuses on Chinese investment in Latin American 
ports in the early 2000s, a time when Chinese economic influence in the region expanded 
considerably. The analysis seeks to explain why there was Chinese investment in ports in 
Ecuador and in Mexico but not in Colombia during this period, a context in which all 
three countries had broader economic ties to China. The thesis examines both in the 
manner in which Latin American ports opened to private and/or foreign investment, and 
how Chinese companies invest in foreign countries. It argues that the alignment or 
misalignment of the manner of opening and Chinese investment practices can explain 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
From as early as the 1970s through the 1990s, there was a wave of neoliberal 
reform in Latin America to deal with the economic crisis experienced as a result of failed 
policies. Particular to the countries Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia, the Mexican 
government implemented the most aggressive reforms, followed by Colombia and then 
Ecuador having implementing the least aggressive reforms of the these case countries. 
Despite the variation in implementation of reforms, all three countries opened their 
economies to foreign direct investment (FDI),1 and all three opened their ports to private 
and foreign investment. Given the differing degrees of aggressiveness in the 
implementation of reforms, we might we expect to see the most Chinese investment in 
Mexican ports, followed by Colombian ports, and minimal investment in Ecuadorian 
ports. While we see the most Chinese investment in Mexican ports and a significant 
amount of Chinese investment in Ecuadorian ports, we see no investment from China in 
Colombian ports. 
By looking at both the Latin American and Chinese sides of this puzzle, this 
thesis seeks to explain why in the early 2000s ports in Mexico and Ecuador had 
significant Chinese investment, while Colombian ports had no Chinese investment, in 
spite of ongoing high levels of Colombia-Chinese trade. This thesis argues that Chinese 
investment in the Latin American ports in Ecuador and Mexico and lack of it in 
Colombian ports can be explained by the alignment or misalignment of how these 
countries ports opened to foreign investment with how Chinese port management 
companies invest overseas. Therefore, in the cases of Ecuador and Mexico, it is because 
their ports were open to 100 percent foreign ownership and that Chinese port  
 
                                                 
1 FDI is defined by UNCTAD as a long-term investment that gives lasting interest and control of an 
enterprise to a resident entity in an economy other than that of the investor. The implication is that the 
investor has a significant degree of influence and control of the management of the enterprise resident in 
the other economy. World Investment Report, 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and 
Development United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2007, 245. 
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management companies were looking to invest where it could have 100 percent 
ownership that led to Chinese investment in Mexican and Ecuadorian ports in the early 
2000s.  
Chapter I will explain the importance of the topic to include the importance of 
national sovereignty and how the privatization of ports is a potential way to jeopardize 
national sovereignty. It will then address some shortcomings in the literature with regard 
to explaining the Chinese investment or lack of Chinese investment in Latin American 
ports and finish by presenting the central causal argument of the thesis. Chapter II will 
give an overview of ports, covering the main types of port management and port 
investment covering the two types of origins of private international port management 
companies to help understand expected behavior and decision making with regard to how 
and where a port management company may decide to invest. Chapter III will look at the 
Latin American side of the puzzle beginning with an outline of liberal economic reform 
in Latin America in recent decades, particularly in the three countries under examination. 
The chapter will follow with Latin America’s push to privatize its ports, giving a brief 
overview of privatization in the ports in Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia showing how the 
three countries were open to and actively seeking foreign investment in port operations. 
Chapter IV will look at the Chinese side of the puzzle beginning with an outline of the 
development of Chinese overseas investment. This will cover the factors influencing 
Chinese companies looking to invest overseas and coping mechanisms used by these 
companies to deal with the challenges associated with venturing into a foreign market. 
Chapter V looks put both sides of the puzzle together to examine Chinese foreign 
investment in Latin American ports. The thesis conclusion in chapter VI shows how and 
why Colombia is different and determines the implications of the findings. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Most trade in the world is done through maritime transportation, in which ports 
are central. Foreign—including Chinese—investment in Latin American ports is critical 
as it potentially affects the national sovereignty of Latin American countries, U.S. 
interests in the region, and international trade flows and therefore the global economy. 
 3 
National sovereignty is important in cases of countries privatizing their ports 
because of the potential of coercive leverage a private enterprise, whether foreign or 
domestic, can have if it holds a controlling stake in a port. The question of who is in 
control of a port is important in that the actor in control of maritime infrastructure can 
make decisions beneficial to the company and/or parent country of the company in 
control of the infrastructure but detrimental to trade flows which ultimately can have an 
effect on both regional economies as well as economies around the globe. 
In the case of this thesis a foreign company from outside the region, such as a 
Chinese company in Latin America, investing in a port could use the port in a manner 
that conflicts with regional interests, as well as national interests and even global 
interests. While more interdependence between countries often discourages international 
political demands interdependence for economic reasons can influence support for 
political demands.2 
The Panama Canal is illustrates the importance of maritime infrastructure and the 
question of what actors control maritime infrastructure. The economy and stability of the 
region and the globe depends on the safe transport of the millions of tons of cargo that 
transit through the canal every year, as commercial shipping activity through the Panama 
Canal accounts for roughly five percent of world trade.3 Some have gone so far as to 
claim that the canal is one of the most important infrastructures in the Western 
Hemisphere.4 
Shipping cargo between the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean using the Panama Canal 
has drastically reduced transport time and cost, for example eliminating the need for ships 
to go around the southernmost tip of South America. The majority of traffic through the 
Panama Canal comes from the eastern United States and is destined for the Far East. 
                                                 
2 Thomas Lum et al., Comparing Global Influence: China’s and US Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, 
and Investment in the Developing World (CRS Report No. RL34620) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2008), 43, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34620.pdf. 
3 “Panama Canal,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed April 01, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/panama-canal.htm. 
4 “ACP General Information,” Panama Canal Authority, accessed April 01, 2011, 
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/general/asi-es-el-canal.html. 
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Significant traffic also moves between Europe and western North America. Traffic 
through the Panama Canal is not limited to these origins or destinations. The remainder 
of countries and regions including those of Central and South America “are 
proportionately more dependent on this vital artery to promote their economic 
development and expand trade.”5 The stopping or slowing of cargo transportation 
through the Panama Canal would likely cause significant increases in transportation costs 
due to delays, affecting cargo producers, transporters and consumer. Therefore, any 
disruption in the flow of commerce through the Panama Canal could directly affect 
global economies. 
And indeed the Panama Canal has a long history of being controlled by foreign 
interests, namely, the U.S. Government. This trajectory has continued. When in 1999 the 
Panama Canal was transferred from U.S. to Panamanian control, Chinese influence 
emerged as increasingly important. Panama Ports Company, established in 1997 by the 
Chinese Port development company Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), manages two ports 
on the canal: the Port of Balboa on the Pacific Ocean side, and the Port of Cristobal on 
the Atlantic Ocean side. Considering Panama Ports Company’s intentions of “carrying 
out investments of more than U.S. $1,000 million in both ports to transform them in 
megaports,”6 some fear that through HPH’s control of these two strategically important 
ports, the Chinese will take control of the Panama Canal based on the interests of China 
rather than Panama, other countries or the global economy.7 
In contrast to the case of the Panama Canal, in other instances countries or 
international organizations have avoided foreign control of ports.8 One example was 
P&O Ports of Australia’s operation of two out of five of the major container ports in 
                                                 
5 “This is the Canal,” Panama Canal Authority, accessed April 01, 2011, 
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/op/routes.html. 
6 “About Panama Ports Company,” Panama Ports Company, accessed April 01, 2011, 
http://www.ppc.com.pa/ppc.php. 
7 Even though the ports used in my case study may not be considered as strategically important as 
these ports, the potential effect on international trade is still very relevant. These ports are all a part of the 
intricate network of global shipping and trade. A disruption in service at any of these ports, no matter the 
reason, will likely have a negative impact on the global economy. 
8 I have not seen evidence to support that the reason for the deals not going through in these examples 
were to avoid foreign influence, neither have I seen evidence to the contrary. 
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India circa 2000. Subsequently, P&O sought but failed to gain control over the operation 
of two additional terminals. If P&O had succeeded, it would have controlled at least 75 
percent of India’s container terminal capacity. Another example is one involving HPH’s 
attempt to “buy a controlling interest” in the Port of Rotterdam’s European Container 
Terminal (ECT.)9 In order to prevent HPH from gaining a major market position in the 
region, the European Commission denied the proposal.10 
Turning to U.S. interests in Latin America, Chinese hard and soft power in Latin 
America—hard power exhibited by port direct investment—has increased in a region 
traditionally dominated by U.S. influence. Importantly, China’s presence in Latin 
America should not automatically be determined a “threat” to U.S. interests. Nonetheless, 
U.S. policy with respect to China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere “should focus on 
ensuring that China acts as a responsible stakeholder that contributes to the region’s 
economic prosperity while respecting the democratic principles that are the guiding 
values of the Inter-American system.”11 To this end, it is necessary to analyze in detail 
Latin American-China relations surrounding the critical question of ports and thereby 
inform our understanding of what measures the United States should—or should not—
take in the future. 
C. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE LITERATURE 
Since 2001, the scope of change in the relationship between Latin American 
political and economic ties with China has been tremendous, moving China from the 
margin to becoming a prominent player in Western Hemisphere affairs. This 
development is in line with the goal of some Latin American countries to strengthen its 
international relationships with new links to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. This 
                                                 
9 Ioannis Nicolas Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition 
(Washington, DC: World Bank Oxford University Press, 2004), 215. 
10 Hutchison already had stakes in the northwestern European ports of Felixstowe, Thamesport, and 
Harwich. 
11 The New Challenge: China in the Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(statement of Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for US Policy, Director of Caribbean Programs, Inter-
American Dialogue), 9, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42905/pdf/CHRG-
110hhrg42905.pdf. 
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thesis addresses the question of what explains Chinese investment in the some Latin 
America’s ports. As background for this portion of the thesis, it is important to analyze 
Latin American countries’ relations with China more broadly which this section aims to 
do. 
China has signed agreements with several Latin American countries that 
demonstrate the significance of China’s relations with those countries. There are three 
levels of agreements in order of significance: strategic partner, cooperative partner, and 
friendly cooperative relations. China has signed politically significant “strategic 
partnership agreements” with Brazil (1993), Venezuela (2001), Mexico (2003), and 
Argentina (2004). According to Domínguez in “China’s Relations with Latin America,” a 
country is only labeled a strategic partner if China truly has a meaningful, collaborative 
relationship with the country and the country is willing to continue to strengthen that 
relationship.12 China has also signed “cooperative partnership” or “friendly and 
cooperative partnership” agreements with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. 
In this overall context of friendly international relations with China, given the study’s 
focus on ports, it is also important to highlight that the cases in question—Ecuador, 
Mexico, and Colombia—all have Pacific coastlines, a structural factor facilitating easy 
trade with China from their ports. 
As background regarding Chinese investment in Latin American ports, it is 
invaluable to describe briefly the economic ties between China and the region. Since 
China has become the global leader in manufacturing and exporting manufactured goods, 
its need for natural resources and energy has grown, presenting the opportunity of 
“resource-rich” Latin American countries such as Colombia, Chile and Peru to expand 
their export options farther than the United States and the European Union. China has 
become the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, purchasing raw materials. China 
has a copper development program with Chile and Peru and steel projects in Brazil. In 
Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, China is interested in oil. China is also interested in 
                                                 
12 Jorge Domínguez, “China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes” 
(working paper, Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, 2006), 25. 
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Brazil for its air plane technology and is interested in investing in it. Brazil also has 
tourism and industrial capacity of interest to China.  
Increased China-Latin America trade has been attractive from the Latin American 
side as well. Since 1990, Latin American economies have been looking to diversify their 
trade partners, and China offers great economic opportunities,13 including trade 
diversification, but also foreign direct investment, and low cost imports.14 China’s 
increased economic growth rate has sent it looking for unexplored markets in addition to 
providing more resources to develop political alliances globally. As a result of Beijing’s 
encouragement for Chinese companies to “go global” and its subsequent assistance in 
that process through mechanisms such as government subsidies, China’s increase in 
foreign direct investment activity in countries throughout the world grabbed the attention 
of both media and other governments in the past decade or so. With the natural resource 
and foods shortage China has experienced and Latin America being a major producer of 
primary products, both China and Latin America benefit from trade with each other.15 
Latin American countries that have complementary economies to China have 
benefitted from China’s growth as an important economic actor in the region.16 Trade 
levels between China and Latin American countries have increased substantially. In the 
early 1990s, China was not a significant importer to any Latin American country, and in 
that decade Peru was the only significant exporter to China. This situation has since 
changed, as Latin American exports to China have grown from almost U.S. $3 billion in 
1999 to U.S. $21.7 billion in 2004, an increase of more than 600 percent in only five 
                                                 
13 The New Challenge: China in the Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 110th Cong (2008) 
(statement of Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for U.S. Policy, Director of Caribbean Programs, Inter-
American Dialogue) 9, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42905/pdf/CHRG-
110hhrg42905.pdf. 
14 Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, “Introduction: Assessing the Implications of China’s Growing 
Presence in the Western Hemisphere,” in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, ed. Riordan 
Roett and Guadalupe Paz (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 19. 
15 Jorge Domínguez, “China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes” 
(working paper, Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, 2006), 25. 
16 Francisco E. Gonzalez, “Latin America in the Economic Equation-Winners and Losers: What Can 
Losers Do?” in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, ed. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 152-153. 
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years.17 In 2004, China’s top five Latin American import markets were as follows: Brazil 
(US $8.7 billion), Chile (US $3.7 billion), Argentina (US $3.3 billion), Mexico (US $2.1 
billion), and Peru (US $1.5 billion). Additionally, in the same year, the top five 
destinations of China’s exports in Latin America were as follows: Mexico (US $5 
billion), Brazil (US $3.7 billion), Panama (US $2.2 billion), Chile (US $1.7 billion), and 
Argentina (US $852 million).18 In 2007 Brazil was China’s largest trading partner 
followed by Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and finally Peru. Venezuela and Colombia are the 
remaining two countries in China’s top seven trading partners list in Latin America.19 
In contrast to these partnerships, China serves as competition for Latin American 
countries dominated by unskilled, labor-intensive manufacturing. Stiff competition from 
China has caused these countries, Mexico for example, to experience losses due to loss of 
market share. They have suffered increasing bilateral trade deficits in trading with China 
and have lost a portion of their most important market—the United States—to China.  
In the case of Mexico, Chinese competition poses a major threat to its markets. 
Mexico is facing trade deficits. Along with substantial growth in trade in Latin America, 
Mexico’s trade with China increased substantially from 1998 and 2004, and by 2005 
Mexico had become China’s second largest trading partner with regard to bilateral trade, 
which continued to increase through 2007.20 Despite the growth in trade between the two 
countries, Mexico is at a disadvantage since the imbalance of trade between the two 
countries favors China.21 Mexico and China are export competitors in manufacturing, the 
auto industry, electronics, and clothing. The smuggling of inexpensive Chinese clothing 
                                                 
17 Kerry Dumbaugh, and Mark P. Sullivan, China’s Growing Interest in Latin America (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 1. 
18 Kerry Dumbaugh, and Mark P. Sullivan, China’s Growing Interest in Latin America (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 2. 
19 The New Challenge: China in the Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 110th Cong (2008) 
(statement of Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for U.S. Policy, Director of Caribbean Programs, Inter-
American Dialogue,) 10, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42905/pdf/CHRG-
110hhrg42905.pdf. 
20 Alejandro Kenny. “China’s Presence in Latin America: A View on Security from the Southern 
Cone,” Military Review 86, no. 5 (2006): 61. 
21 Robert Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: the Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 200. 
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into Mexico is a major obstacle for Mexico.22 Mexico used to be the United States’ 
second trading partner; China is now second putting Mexico third. 
One central hypothesis that emerges from the literature for explaining why we 
might observe more or less Chinese investment in Latin American countries in general 
and specifically in Latin American ports is centered on ideology. The idea is that we 
would observe greater Chinese investment in a country governed by a left-leaning 
government than in one governed by a right-leaning one and consequently in that 
country’s ports. However, the majority of growing relationships between Latin American 
and communist countries since the late 1960s have been economic and not ideological.23 
Looking at Latin America, not limited to my case countries, it is not difficult to 
see how ideology fails as an explaining factor for the variation in Chinese investment in 
Latin America and subsequently in their ports. China built and maintained relationships 
with Latin American governments that opposed communism without partiality for left-
wing governments, relationships that were established on the opportunity of diplomatic 
and economic benefits regardless of what type of regime the country had.24 Concretely, 
Venezuela’s government from the late 1990s to the present has a reputation for being on 
the far left—due to governance of the country by leftist President Hugo Chavez (1999–
2013)—in general and certainly relative to Colombia—due to governance of the country 
by conservative Andres Pastrana Arango (1998–2002) and Alcaro Uribe Velez (2002–
2010)—since the 1990s.25 Despite these contrasting ideological positions, imports and 
                                                 
22 Francisco E. Gonzalez, “Latin America in the Economic Equation-Winners and Losers: What Can 
Losers Do?” in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, ed. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 154. Brazil and Argentina, among other countries 
have complained “that cheap Chinese manufactured goods are replacing those produced domestically.” 
Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, “Introduction: Assessing the Implications of China’s Growing Presence 
in the Western Hemisphere,” in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, ed. Riordan Roett and 
Guadalupe Paz (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 16. 
23 G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System (New York: Free Press, 1977), 
77. 
24 Jorge Domínguez, “China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes” 
(working paper, Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC, 2006), 3-5. 
25 Pablo Heidrich and Diana Tussie, “Post-Neoliberalism and the New Left in the Americas: The 
Pathways of Economic and Trade Policies,” in unpublished paper delivered at the ISA Conference, 
Chicago, February, 2007, 43–44. 
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exports between China and Colombia was higher than imports and exports between 
China and Venezuela during 2001–5.26 
Considering, as stated above, that most of the relationship growth between China 
and Latin American countries since the late 1960s has been based on economic interests 
and not ideology it would seem that economic pragmatism, and not ideology, then might 
explain Chinese investment in Latin American ports. However, obvious economically 
pragmatic factors also cannot explain the observed variation specifically in Latin 
American ports. For example, one hypothesis that emerges from China’s economic 
relations with Latin America begins with the variation in the extent to which China is in 
competition with individual countries for markets to sell their products. While China has 
become an important economic partner for some Latin America countries, for others it 
has become an economic competitor, depending on the country’s available commodities. 
Generally, countries that are exporters of natural resources have benefited, and countries 
that are manufacturers such as Mexico have encountered competition from China to their 
disadvantage.27 
One example that demonstrates how this hypothesis falls short is the Peru-China 
economic relationship and lack of Chinese investment or involvement by China in Peru’s 
ports. It is curious since one of China’s interests in Pacific ports is to facilitate shipments  
 
                                                 
26 Colombia,” United Nations International Merchandise Trade Statistics Country Pages, accessed 
April 01, 2011, http://comtrade.un.org/pb/CountryPages.aspx?y=2005; “Peru,” United Nations 
International Merchandise Trade Statistics Country Pages, accessed April 01, 2011, 
http://comtrade.un.org/pb/CountryPages.aspx?y=2005; “Venezuela,” United Nations International 
Merchandise Trade Statistics Country Pages, accessed April 01, 2011, 
http://comtrade.un.org/pb/CountryPages.aspx?y=2005. 
27 Francisco E. Gonzalez, “Latin America in the Economic Equation-Winners and Losers: What Can 
Losers Do?” in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, ed. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 162–163; The New Challenge: China in the Western 
Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate 
for US Policy, Director of Caribbean Programs, Inter-American Dialogue), 10, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42905/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg42905.pdf; Jorge Domínguez, 
“China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes” (working paper, Inter-




 According to Ellis, “the growth of Latin America’s commerce with China is 
driving an expansion and modernization of the Pacific port infrastructure that carries that 
commerce.”29  
Investing in Peru’s Pacific ports should be attractive to China for a number of 
reasons. China’s resource hunting is a main determinant in Chinese overseas foreign 
direct investment (OFDI). China’s interest in Peru’s mining sector is exhibited not only 
by the fact that 70 percent of Peru’s exports to China are minerals30 but also that Chinese 
companies are doing the actual mining. For example, in 1992 the Shougang 
Corporation—one of the largest steel companies in China—bought and took over 
operations of the Hierro Peru Mining Company.31 Additionally, Chinese companies are 
interested in Peruvian natural gas and oil. In Peru for example, PlusPetrol Norte owns 
two oil fields in Peru which account for 65 percent of the country’s oil production.32 
China National Offshore Drilling Corporation (CNODC) is significant to PlusPetrol 
Norte, and therefore to Peru’s petroleum industry, with a 45 percent stake in the 
company.
33
 However, the “expansion and modernization of the Pacific port 
infrastructure,” referred to above, seems to have missed Peru, despite the major trade 
partnership with China. 
Building on this partner versus competitor relationship, we might hypothesize that 
competitors of China would not welcome Chinese investment in ports. In recognizing the 
                                                 
28 Alejandro Kenny. “China’s Presence in Latin America: A View on Security from the Southern 
Cone,” Military Review 86, no. 5 (Sep, 2006): 61. 
29 Robert Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: the Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 278. 
30 Anthony Bebbington, and Denise Humphreys Bebbington, An Andean Avatar: Post-Neoliberal and 
Neoliberal Strategies for Promoting Extractive Industries, No. 11710 (Manchester, UK: The University of 
Manchester, 2010), 13, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684540. 
31 Bing Ren, Hai Liang, and Yeng Zheng, “An Institutional Perspective and the Role of the State for 
Chinese OFDI,” in Chinese International Investments, eds. Ilan Alon, Marc Fetscherin, and Philippe 
Gugler (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 30; Simon Romero, “Tensions 
Over Chinese Mining Venture in Peru,” New York Times, Americas, August 14, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/world/americas/15chinaperu.html?_r=0. 
32 Robert Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: the Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 150. 
33 Robert Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: the Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 150. 
 12 
negative effects of competition with China, Mexican industry has advocated government 
protection against the importation of Chinese goods. Additionally, according to Ellis, “the 
lack of significant Mexican primary-product exports to China, and the competition that 
has characterized the relationship between these two countries in manufactures, are 
reflected, likewise, in the relatively limited presence of Chinese companies in Mexico.”34 
Consequently, one might expect that Mexico—which has been in competition with China 
at least since joining the WTO in 200135—is market competition for China and that 
China would not be a primary investor in Mexico’s ports. 
Negating this hypothesis is the fact that four of Mexico’s main ports, including 
the ports Ensenada International Terminal (EIT), Terminal Internaional de Manzanillo 
(TIM) and, Internacional de Contenedores Asociados de Veracruz (ICAVE) beginning in 
2001, and Lazaro Cardenas Terminal (LCT) beginning in 2003,36 have been not only 
been invested in by China, but were under significant Chinese control. Additionally, what 
is more puzzling is why a Chinese company would invest in the east coast port ICAVE 
when doing so does not facilitate cheaper transportation of goods to and from China. 
Considering the Chinese investment in Mexico’s port and examining the extent to which 
China is in competition with Mexico points out that a strong economic tie and higher 
trade between China and any particular Latin American country does not correlate with 
Chinese investment in that country’s ports. 
D. ARGUMENT 
This thesis will explain why we observe varied outcomes in terms of private 
investment in ports and, more specifically, Chinese investment in the ports of Ecuador, 
Mexico and Colombia. Having Chinese investment in the ports in Ecuador Mexico and 
Colombia depends on the degree that each of these countries’ ports have opened to 
                                                 
34 Robert Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: the Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 206. 
35 Enrique Dussel Peters, “The Implications of China’s Entry into the WTO for Mexico,” Heinrich 
Böll Foundation, 2005, 24, accessed April 08, 2011, http://www.cancun2003.org/download_es/GIP-
DUSSEL-No24.pdf. 
36 “Ports under Mexico,” Hutchinson Port Holdings, accessed December 9, 2010, 
http://www.hph.com/globalbusiness/ports.aspx?selgid=7#Section7. 
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private foreign direct investment respectively aligning with how Chinese port 
management companies invest overseas. There are many factors influencing both the 
Latin American and Chinese sides of this puzzle. From the Latin American side—to do 
with how Latin American countries opened to foreign investment—factors include the 
influence on how much a port opens to foreign investment which is particular to each 
country and to the internal and external forces driving the change to existing policy. From 
the Chinese—to do with how Chinese companies invest directly in the ports of foreign 
countries—factors include the influence on how China’s OFDI policy developed which 
dictates the policy that a Chinese company investing outside of China must follow 
coupled with both internal and external forces driving locational choices of where a 
Chinese business will invest. This thesis will show how these factors on both sides of the 
puzzle have developed in such a way to result in Chinese investment in Ecuadorian and 
Mexican ports but not in Colombian ports. 
Before looking at the two sides of the puzzle, it is important to give an overview 
of ports which will be done in Chapter II. Then, the Latin American side of the puzzle 
will be covered in Chapter III. Chapter IV will look at the Chinese side of the puzzle. 
Chapter V will put both sides of the puzzle together to examine Chinese foreign 
investment in Latin American ports. And finally, the thesis conclusion in chapter VI will 
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II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFLUENCE IN THE PORT SECTOR 
To understand the issue of port investment and in particular private and foreign 
port investment, one must first have a basic understanding of what a port is and how it 
operates. It is important in particular to this thesis to understand the coordination of the 
port, the role that a port authority—or any other responsible institution—plays in 
regulating the port, its infrastructure and activities. The first section of this chapter will 
define what a port is and in particular detail what it means for a port to be public or 
private or a mixture of public and private, based on the question of what actors control 
what aspects of ports and port operations and give a brief history of the ownership and 
operations of ports. The second section will give an overview of the two origins of 
private port management companies and identify which category the various Chinese port 
management companies fall. These two sections are crucial to the thesis because they 
look at both sides of private port management. The first section looks at the type of port 
management of a given port and the second section looks at the type of port manager. 
Both of these help to explain the variation that we see in the investment from China (port 
manager) in Colombian, Ecuadorian and Mexican ports (given ports). 
A. PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND MIXED PORTS 
In its simplest form, a seaport can be defined as a marina where ships or boats 
stopover to load and unload cargo.37 For simplicity purposes seaport will be referred to as 
simply a port in the remainder of this thesis. Many activities take place in a port 
concurrently to facilitate the continuous entrance, unloading, loading, servicing and 
exiting of ships. Services required could include infrastructural services namely berth 
construction, construction of parking for the various means of transportation for the 
cargo, and construction of loading and unloading zones for the cargo. Superstructural 
services could be offered to include the provision of cranes to handle cargo, distribution 
                                                 
37 A port can serve as a hub for the connection and transshipment of long haul cargo to be transported 
more resourcefully by several smaller ships. In the case of a small or difficult to get to shipping destination 
or origin it may be less expensive for a shipper or a group of shippers to send a bulk shipment to a 
transshipment center where the shipment is then divided into smaller shipments for different destinations. 
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centers for processing of goods, stevedoring services
38
 and storage by warehousing 
companies. Beyond infrastructural and superstructural services, still other services could 
include administration of transportation and cargo, management of cargo operations—
loading and unloading of cargo—and various services provided by shipbrokers and other 
agents.39 
1. Actors and Services 
Several actors could be involved in a port’s management and operation. One 
common actor is a port authority. Port authorities may offer a myriad of services. An 
acceptable definition of port authorities is “administrative bodies which generally occupy 
a relatively independent position between state and market and whose administrative 
structures can vary greatly.”40 Port authorities typically have an established relationship 
with both central and local government as well as with private ventures. These 
relationships are important as the port authorities are in charge of both the “public 
management of the port (safety and access) and the private operation (site leasing and 
superstructure).”41 
Beyond the port authority, other actors are involved in port operations through the 
provision of services to the vessel and cargo (See Table 1.) For example, an ocean-going 
vessel almost always requires the assistance of a pilot when approaching a port. The pilot 
guides the ship to dock at the pier with the aid of tugboats and linesmen. Once the vessel 
is pier side the unloading and loading of cargo by longshoremen (stevedores) can start.42  
                                                 
38 A stevedore is a dock worker usually loading and unloading cargo from ships. 
39 Henrik Stevens, The Institutional Position of Seaports: An International Comparison, Vol 51 (New 
York: Springer, 1999), 51. 
40 Henrik Stevens, The Institutional Position of Seaports: An International Comparison, Vol 51 (New 
York: Springer, 1999), 4. 
41 Henrik Stevens, The Institutional Position of Seaports: An International Comparison, Vol 51 (New 
York: Springer, 1999), 28. 
42 Henrik Stevens, The Institutional Position of Seaports: An International Comparison, Vol 51 (New 
York: Springer, 1999), 5. 
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Table 1.   Port Services Examples43 
Services to Vessels Services to Cargo 
Piloting Stevedoring 
Towing Wharf Handling 
Mooring Transfers to land transportation 
Dredging Storage 
Utilities Processing (consolidation, bagging, 
mixing) 
Ship repair Cargo tracking 
Environmental services Security 
 Rental of specialized equipment 
 
2. Historical Role of Port Authority and Private Companies 
Prior to the 1980s, many ports were typically owned and managed by a port 
authority.44 At the same time, many private companies managed infrastructural, 
superstructural and additional services in ports around the globe under contract with the 
port authority. There was typically no confusion on the distinction of public and private 
roles as the roles did not vary significantly. However, the distinction between the port 
authority accounts and local public accounts were not necessarily as clear. For example, 
the ports in northern Europe, such as Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg, traditionally 
have been connected with municipalities so much so that in some cases it has been 
difficult to “disentangle port accounts from local public accounts.”45  
After the 1980s, stricter public budgets coupled with growing financial 
requirements in ports have driven many countries to seek private participation in ports. 
Private involvement in ports had already been somewhat common with regard to 
provision of services. Not only has there been an increase of private involvement in the 
provision of services and private involvement in the management of port operations since 
the 1980s, there has also been an increase in private involvement in the building of port 
                                                 
43 Ioannis Nicolas Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition 
(Washington, DC: World Bank Oxford University Press, 2004), 208. 
44 Ioannis Nicolas Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition 
(Washington, DC: World Bank Oxford University Press, 2004), 209. 
45 Lourdes Trujillo and Gustavo Nombela, “Privatization and Regulation of the Seaport Industry” 
(Research Policy Working Paper 2181, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1999), 4-5. 
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infrastructures.46 Private participation in a port now varies “from minor contracts for 
private operation and maintenance of state-owned equipment, to wholesale provision of 
major services, such as terminal operations, to major concession contracts with capital 
investment elements.”47 As a result of increasing private participation in all aspects of 
port ownership, regulation, and operations even the port authorities are no longer 
necessarily public institutions. In other words there is private participation in port 
authorities themselves sometimes making delineation of public and private control in a 
port unclear.  
3. The Four Main Port Models 
Ports range from being fully privatized to fully public, though these extremes are 
uncommon. With most ports in the world the land is publicly owned and regulated but it 
has some degree of private involvement in operations.48 The four main port models, in 
terms of the public-private balance, from most public to most private are public service 
ports, landlord ports, tool ports, and private ports.49 
A public service port implicitly has no private sector involvement, and all the 
three elements (port regulation, land, and operation) are controlled by the government or 
                                                 
46 The trend of private investors improving port infrastructure stems from neoliberal reform in Latin 
America, to include in ports, which commonly sought private investment to help update and improve port 
infrastructure. 
47 A concession is a grant of land or other property especially from a government in return for services 
rendered or proposed or for a particular use. According to Smith, the World Bank identifies that from 1990 
through 1998, there were 112 major port projects with private participation in developing countries, 
totaling more than $9 billion in investment commitments, primarily in Latin America and Asia, with Brazil, 
China, and Argentina each having 12 or more major projects. Arthur L. Smith, “Privatization of Water 
Transportation Systems,” Management Analysis, Incorporated (Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
2nd International Congress on Maritime Technological Innovations and Research, University of Cadiz, 
Spain, 2000), 4, accessed December 9, 2010, 
http://ncppp.org/councilinstitutes/smith_privatewatertranssys.pdf. 
48 Arthur L. Smith, “Privatization of Water Transportation Systems,” Management Analysis, 
Incorporated (Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2nd International Congress on Maritime 
Technological Innovations and Research, University of Cadiz, Spain, 2000), 3, accessed December 9, 2010, 
http://ncppp.org/councilinstitutes/smith_privatewatertranssys.pdf. 
49 Ioannis Nicolas Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition 
(Washington, DC: World Bank Oxford University Press, 2004), 209. 
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public authority through the local port authority.
50
 The port authority owns, maintains, 
and operates all assets in the port. However, cargo-handling operations are typically 
carried out by private labor contracted by the port authority.51 In other words, public 
service ports’ operations include the provision of a range of services under the 
management of a port authority though some of the services can be provided by private 
companies, as indicated in Table 2. Examples of public seaports can still be found in 
Israel, India and in some African countries. 


































































































Public Public Public Public Public Public Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed 
Tool Public Public Public Public Private Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed 
Landlord Public Public Mixed Private Private Private Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed 
Private Private Private Private Private Private Mixed Private Private Mixed Mixed 
 
                                                 
50 Li Nan, Han Yiqun, and Xu Yuan, “Privatization and Deregulation of the Seaport Industry: 
Economic Analysis and Policy Choice,” Journal of the Macao Polytechnic Institute no. 1, Serial no. 3 Part 
1 (2009): 141. See this source for more on three elements: Arthur L. Smith, “Privatization of Water 
Transportation Systems,” Management Analysis, Incorporated (Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
2nd International Congress on Maritime Technological Innovations and Research, University of Cadiz, 
Spain, 2000), 3, accessed December 9, 2010, 
http://ncppp.org/councilinstitutes/smith_privatewatertranssys.pdf. 
51 According the World Bank, “Public service ports are usually controlled by (or even part of) the 
Ministry of Transport (and/or Communications) and the chairman (or director general) is a civil servant 
appointed by, and/or directly reporting to, the minister concerned. Among the main functions of a service 
port are cargo-handling activities. In some developing country ports the cargo-handling activities are 
executed by a separate public entity, often referred to as the “cargo handling company.” Such public 
companies usually report to the same ministry as the port authority. To have public entities with different 
and sometimes conflicting interests reporting to the same Ministry, and forced to co-operate in the same 
operational environment, constitutes a serious management challenge. For this reason the port authorities 
and cargo handling companies of Mombassa, Kenya, and Tema, and Takoradi, Ghana, were merged into 
one single entity.” World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2003), 
17. 
52 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2003), 17. 
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Tool ports and landlord ports have more private participation than public service 
ports. The difference between the tool and landlord ports is that the tool port has more 
public participation and less private participation than the landlord port. Similar to the 
public service ports, in the tool port the port authority owns, develops and maintains the 
port infrastructure and superstructure and it generally operates all the equipment it owns 
in the tool port.  
On the other hand, the landlord port has more private involvement in the port than 
the tool port.53 The function of the port authority in the landlord port model includes port 
management, maintenance and development, therefore it supplies the necessary 
infrastructure and facilities and policy implementation.54 What is different under the tool 
port model is that the port authority makes land and superstructures available to private 
cargo-handling companies that are licensed by the port authority, and they execute cargo 
operations on board the vessel as well as on the quay or dock.55 
Finally, in the private port model—unlike the other three port models—the port is 
fully privatized and the land that the port is on is fully privately owned. In addition to the 
land being transferred from the public to the private sector, the government may also 
transfer the regulatory functions to the private successor companies. The few ports of this 
type are located mainly in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.56 
a. Landlord Ports in Latin America 
The ports examined in this thesis, covered in chapter III, fall into the category of a 
landlord port. This section will provide a more detailed background on the landlord port 
model to further the argument of the thesis. 
                                                 
53 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2003), 11. 
54 Patrick Verhoeven, “A Review of Port Authority Functions: Towards a Renaissance?” Maritime 
Policy & Management: The Flagship Journal of International Shipping and Port Research, 37:3 (2010): 
253. 
55 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2003), 17; “Ports 
Autonomes” in France is an example of a container terminal managed and operated as a tool port. 
56 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2003), 18–19. 
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In the landlord model, the port authority is a regulatory entity as well as a 
landlord. In other words, the government has no involvement in the port other than in 
matters pertaining to security of the port and environmental regulation to control 
pollution.57 While port and land regulation is the responsibility of the public sector, the 
private sector is dominant in the regulation of port operations. The port authority leases 
infrastructure—such as a refinery, a tank terminal or a chemical plant—to private 
companies and/or private industry that execute all of the port operations.58 The private 
port operators provide and maintain their own superstructure as well as purchase and 
install the necessary equipment59 on the terminal grounds. At a landlord port dock, labor 
is typically hired by the private terminal operator.60 See Table 2 for a detailed delineation 
of public and private responsibility in the landlord port. This model is common 
particularly in North American European and Latin American seaports.61 
The shift from public to more private participation in ports since the 1980s has 
certainly been evident in many Latin American countries in that most major ports in Latin 
America that were once state owned have been sold to private companies.62 Similar to 
global trends, most ports in Latin America use the landlord port model whereby the port 
infrastructure is owned by the port authority, and the superstructure is put up for 
                                                 
57 Li Nan, Han Yiqun, and Xu Yuan, “Privatization and Deregulation of the Seaport Industry: 
Economic Analysis and Policy Choice,” Journal of the Macao Polytechnic Institute no. 1, Serial no. 3 Part 
1 (2009): 141. 
58 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2003), 18. Examples 
of landlord ports are Rotterdam, Antwerp, New York and, since 1997, Singapore. Today the landlord port 
is the dominant port model in larger and medium sized ports. 
59 Necessary equipment would be determined by what is required by their business (e.g., quay cranes, 
transtainers, conveyor belts.) 
60 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2003), 18. 
61 Li Nan, Han Yiqun, and Xu Yuan, “Privatization and Deregulation of the Seaport Industry: 
Economic Analysis and Policy Choice,” Journal of the Macao Polytechnic Institute no. 1, Serial no. 3 Part 
1 (2009): 141. 
62 Alejandro Micco and Natalia Perez, “Maritime Transport Costs and Port Efficiency” (Seminar 
“Towards Competitiveness: The Institutional Path,” Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors, Inter-
American Development Bank and Inter-American Investment Corporation, Santiago, Chile, March 16, 
2001): 28; Sydney Cass and Hugh O’Mahony,” Port Privatisation: Process, Players and Progress” (London, 
UK: Integrated Intelligent Research Publications, 1996): 116, 209. Importantly, some major ports such as 
several in India and Sri Lanka have remained public service type ports. Ioannis Nicolas Kessides: 
Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition (Washington, DC: World Bank 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 209. 
 22 
concession to a private company.63 Most general, non-specialized ports64 have already 
been concessioned to be operated privately. In addition, many specialized ports are under 
private ownership or are leased.  
Some regions, including Latin America, are more apprehensive about private 
monopolies than others. In Latin America, this apprehension is driven by historical 
damage resulting from the economic power of a small number of powerful families or 
foreign multinational companies. In Central America in the 1950s Bulmer-Thomson 
describes foreign companies in insurance and shipping that “operated price-fixing cartels, 
which did not endear them to the local population.” Specifically in transportation the 
example is provided in Guatemala of price discrimination by International Railways of 
Central America (IRCA) to shift external trade toward the Atlantic coast Puerto 
Barrios—a port controlled by IRCA’s parent company United Fruit Company.65 
Therefore, unlike some ports in Britain, fully privatized ports in Latin America are not 
foreseen. We can expect, however, that existing common user ports will remain landlord 
ports, though new ports may take on different forms. 
To avoid private monopolies in Latin American ports, both domestic and 
international port operating companies control many of the comparatively small ports as 
well as terminals within ports creating competition between the ports and terminals.
66
 For 
example, the port in Buenos Aires does not permit an existing concessionaire to become 
the concessionaire over another terminal due to the advantage it may give that 
                                                 
63 Alejandro Micco and Natalia Perez, “Maritime Transport Costs and Port Efficiency” (Seminar 
“Towards Competitiveness: The Institutional Path,” Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors, Inter-
American Development Bank and Inter-American Investment Corporation, Santiago, Chile, March 16, 
2001): 28. 
64 A general, non-specialized port is a port containing a terminal or multiple terminals that have the 
infrastructure to support the movement of cargo of all types. A specialized port has the infrastructure to 
support the movement of one type of cargo. For example, a container port is a specialized port is a terminal 
or multiple terminals equipped with container handling equipment and would not be equipped to handle 
break bulk cargo, for example. The ports in my case countries are specialized container ports or container 
terminals with in a port. 
65 Victor. Bulmer-Thomas, “The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence,” Volume 
77 of Cambridge Latin American Studies (Port Chester, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 105. 
66 Antonio Estache, Marianela Gonzalez, and Lourdes Trujillo, “Efficiency Gains from Port Reform 
and the Potential for Yardstick Competition: Lessons from Mexico,” World Development 30, no. 4 (2002): 
545. 
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concessionaire over another. In Peru, Lima’s general cargo flows through its only port, 
Callao. Before putting it up for concession, the port is scheduled to be split into two or 
three terminals to encourage competition before it is allowed to be concessioned.67 
With the transition of ports to private ownership since the 1980s, the need for 
private port and terminal management companies emerged. Subsequently the number of 
private port management companies—international companies in particular—has grown 
to fulfil this need. The following section addresses the two types of port management 
companies. The first—already in existence to a large degree—is the ocean carrier type. 
The second—which came about mainly with the increasing demand mentioned above—is 
the “pure” port management type. 
B. PRIVATE PORT MANAGEMENT COMPANIES 
In order to gain a general understanding of how a private Chinese port 
management company determines which ports to invest in, first we must understand the 
origins of the port management company since it influences the business strategy of the 
company addressed in this section. After delineating the two port management company 
types we will identify the private port management companies that are examined for this 
thesis using the following criteria: 1) the port management company is Chinese68 and 2) 
the port management company has significant investments in ports outside of China. 
Using the difference in origins and therefore business strategy, the section will then 
suggest how and why their choice in location may differ. The combination of expected 
private port management behavior from this section and expected behavior of Chinese 
investment companies looking to invest overseas (discussed in chapter IV) will be used in 
the conclusion chapter to explain how the companies actually made their port choices. 
                                                 
67 Jan Hofmann, “Latin American Ports: Results and Determinants of Private Sector Participation,” 
International Journal of maritime economics, 3 no. 2 (2001); 224. 
68 For the purpose of this thesis port management companies headquartered in mainland China, Hong 
Kong or Taiwan are considered Chinese.  
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There are generally two types of a private port management company. One type is 
that of an ocean carrier69 that enters into the business of managing container terminals 
serving to protect the ocean carrier’s usual trade routes from outside competition.70 The 
ocean carrier port management companies—dating back to the 1960s—base decisions for 
where to invest and operate largely on where it is advantageous for the affiliated ocean 
carrier, while taking into account external opportunities for investment. Examples of port 
management companies that entered as an ocean carrier include AP Moller-Maersk 
(APM), Terminal Evergreen Marine Corporation (Evergreen) and China Ocean Shipping 
Company (COSCO) Pacific. COSCO Pacific is one Chinese port management company 
in focus for this thesis. Evergreen is a Chinese port management company but is not in 
focus for this thesis since it only has operations in two countries outside of China.71  
The other type is the pure port management company. With a few exceptions, this 
type came about far more recently with the institutional change of port privatization in 
the 1990s.72 The increasing need for private port and terminal management companies 
encouraged the development of transnational corporations (TNCs) as private international 
terminal and port operators to manage the operations of container terminals and ports 
throughout the world.73 Pure port management companies base decisions for where to 
invest and generally operate purely on the objectives of the company needs taking into 
account external opportunities for investment. Examples of this type include HPH, Port 
                                                 
69 An ocean carrier is a company that operates vessels to perform the carriage of goods by way of the 
sea and is also known as a shipping line. An ocean carrier arranges all movement of vessels, under the 
ocean carriers management, from port to port with the purpose of moving cargo. It is also known as a 
shipping line. The ocean carrier may or may not own ships. 
70 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 
Internationalisation: The Case of the Container Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics, 9 (2007): 
7. 
71 “Global Transshipment Hubs,” Evergreen Marine Corporation, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.evergreen-marine.com/tbi1/jsp/TBI1_GlobalTranHub.jsp. 
72 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 
Internationalisation: The Case of the Container Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics 9 (2007): 
4. 
73 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 
Internationalisation: The Case of the Container Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics 9 (2007): 
2. For a history on the evolution of private port management companies see Daniel Olivier, Francesco 
Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of Internationalisation: The Case of the Container 
Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics, 9 (2007): 7. 
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of Singapore Authority (PSA) International, New World Holdings Company, P&O Ports, 
China Merchant Holdings International, Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), American 
President Lines (APL), and Dubai Ports (DP) World. HPH is the other Chinese port 
management company in focus for this thesis contrary to the remaining Chinese port 
management companies since they have limited operations outside of China.74. See Table 
3 for examples of both types of port management companies. 
The differences, important to this thesis, discussed above in the two types of port 
management deal with how the company entered the port management market which will 
influence the company’s business strategy and subsequently will influence locational 
choice of port management companies.75 




HPH Hong Kong (China) Pure 
APM Denmark Pure 
PSA Singapore Pure 
China Merchant Holdings Hong Kong (China) Pure 
P&O Ports UK Pure 
COSCO Pacific Hong Kong (China) Pure 
Dubai Ports World United Arab Emirates Pure 
Eurogate/Eurokai Group Germany Pure 
Evergreen Taiwan (China) Ocean Carrier 
Mediterranean Shipping Co Switzerland Ocean Carrier 
SSA Marine US Pure 
New World Holdings Hong Kong (China) Pure 
Hamburger Hafen LA Germany Pure 
NOL/APL Singapore Ocean Carrier 
Modern Terminals Limited Hong Kong (China) Pure 
                                                 
74 Specifically, China Merchant Holdings focuses its business in China and has limited port operations 
outside of China. New World Holdings Company similarly focuses its business in mainland China, Hong 
Kong and Macau. Modern Terminals International only has business in Hong Kong and mainland China. 
75 75 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 
Internationalisation: The Case of the Container Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics 9 (2007): 
15. 
76 76 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 






Hanjin Shipping South Korea Ocean Carrier 
OOCL Hong Kong (China) Ocean Carrier 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
(NYK) Line 
Japan Ocean Carrier 
Dragados Spain Pure 
CMA-CGM France Ocean Carrier 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
The entities that have an influence on the port are significant because these are the 
entities in control of the port and its operations. This chapter outlined the public and 
private influence on the port sector. Specifically it defined public, tool, landlord and 
private ports delineating the degree of involvement in each type of port. The public port 
authorities provide more services and oversight in the public port and to a gradually 
lesser degree provide services in the tool and landlord ports and very little or no provision 
of services in private ports.  
Considering the private port management aspect of the puzzle of this thesis, the 
chapter then gave an overview of the development of two types of private port 
management companies—ocean carrier port management companies and the “pure” port 
management company—in order for us to understand the nature of investment behavior 
that is expected and common to the type of port management company it is. The ocean 
carrier type tends to locate its operations in cities where the ocean carrier shipping line 
has established trade routes. On the other hand the “pure” port management company 
tends to locate its operations based on its business strategy. HPH and COSCO were 
identified as the Chinese port management companies relevant to this thesis considering 
these companies both fit the criteria of being a Chinese company and having significant 
overseas investments in ports during the early 2000s. These companies coupled with the 
ports they invested in will be further examined in chapter V. 
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III. PRIVATIZATION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
THE PORTS OF COLOMBIA, ECUADOR AND MEXICO 
To understand foreign private investment in Latin American ports, it is important 
to situate it within the broader context of liberal economic reform in the region. Chapter 
III aims to give an overview of neoliberal reform in Latin American. It will focus 
specifically on privatization and opening to foreign investment, particularly in my case 
countries, Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia. Neoliberal reform, and in particular 
privatization and opening to FDI, is important to this thesis because the approach a 
country takes in privatizing and opening to foreign investment has an impact on the 
degree it opens to foreign investment. The degree of openness to investment is a 
determinant of who invests. Not only is this true of Latin America in general, it also 
applies specifically to investment in its ports. 
This chapter begins with an overview of economic policy in Latin America from 
the 1930s to the 1990s. This is followed by a detailed description of neoliberal reform, 
privatization, and opening to FDI in my case countries, Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia.  
The description of Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia’s ports privatizing and 
opening to foreign investment in chapter III relies on an understanding of the definition 
of the different types of ports and those involved in the management and operations of a 
port given in chapter II. The explanation of how privatization and opening to foreign 
investment in my country cases and particularly in their ports in chapter III will give 
background to the Latin American side of my research while Chapter IV will provide the 
Chinese background to include Chinese OFDI policy development followed by Chinese 
overseas investments. These chapters will provide the foundation for answering the 
question of my thesis in chapter V, “why do we observe significant Chinese investment 
in the ports of Ecuador and Mexico, but not in Colombian ports, in spite of the significant 
degree of Colombia-Chinese trade?” 
A. OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA FROM 
THE 1930S TO THE 1990S WITH A FOCUS ON NEOLIBERAL REFORM 
In Latin America (see Figure 1) from the 1930s to the 1990s the state served as a 
crucial economic actor. This role was characterized by markets that were regulated 
heavily by the government, including price controls and barriers to international trade, 
such as taxes and tariffs. During that time, economic policy focused on “state-led 
industrialization” with the goal of increasing growth in the economy. Public enterprises 
were expected to handle externalities in a resourceful manner, to address the concerns of 
the public, lessen the exposure to outside shocks, and encourage growth in the 
economy.77 However, there was a failure of the existing policies in handling money 
shortages which left Latin American countries with fiscal deficits, trade deficits, and debt 
services. This economic crisis in Latin America encouraged neoliberal policies to be 
considered even by those previously advocating nationalism and prompted economic 
reform mainly in the 1980s and 1990s, though some countries, such as Chile began 
reform as early as the 1970s.78 
77 Maria Victoria Murillo, “Political Bias in Policy Convergence: Privatization Choices in Latin 
America,” World Politics 54, no. 4 (2002): 464. 
78 Maria Victoria Murillo, “Political Bias in Policy Convergence: Privatization Choices in Latin 
America,” World Politics 54, no. 4 (2002): 465. 
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Figure 1.  Map pf Latin America 
The damage resulting from this crisis pressed governments into dealing with the 
risks associated with neoliberal reforms and further eroded resistance to privatization by 
lessening the attraction of financially strained state-owned enterprises for suppliers, 
workers, and unsatisfied consumers.79 The goal of the economic reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s was to have a free market with minimal regulation by the government. Measures 
implemented in this regard were trade liberalization, privatization of the public sector, 
and deregulation.80 
Some Latin American governments, such as those in Argentina, Chile, Mexico 
and Peru, implemented more aggressive reform while other governments, such as 
                                                 
79 Maria Victoria Murillo, “Political Bias in Policy Convergence: Privatization Choices in Latin 
America,” World Politics 54, no. 4 (2002): 465;  Laurence Whitehead, Latin America: A New 
Interpretation (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 164. 
80 Luciano Martinez Valle, “Endogenous Peasant Responses to Structural Adjustment” in Rural 
Progress, Rural Decay: Neoliberal Adjustment Policies and Local Initiatives, eds. Lisa L North and John 
D. Cameron (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Incorporated, 2003), 86. 
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Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela implemented more cautious reforms.81 For example, 
the governments of Chile and Mexico sold off their state-owned enterprises in the mid-
1980s and soon after most Latin American public sector enterprises were sold to the 
private sector.82 
Chile led economic reform in Latin America beginning in the 1970s. The 
governments of many Latin American countries followed Chile’s example by opening 
their countries to foreign investment. This included sectors that were not previously open 
such as telecommunications, petroleum exploration, and power generation and 
distribution.
83
 Other Latin American countries implemented economic reform at varying 
times. 
Of the countries examined in this thesis, Mexico was a more aggressive reformer 
and Colombia and Ecuador less so. Ecuador was the least aggressive reformer of the four. 
Nonetheless, in the 1980s and 1990s all three countries to a substantial degree opened up 
their economies to FDI following the 1982 debt crisis.
84
 
1. Privatization in Latin America 
Privatization spread across Latin America as both a way to improve short-term 
revenue and to use private capital markets to fund economic reconstruction.85 Rapid 
deregulation, privatization, and growth of private land markets drove an increase in 
poverty and a decrease in the domestic food supply. According to Valle, the conventional 
                                                 
81 Luciano Martinez Valle, “Endogenous Peasant Responses to Structural Adjustment” in Rural 
Progress, Rural Decay: Neoliberal Adjustment Policies and Local Initiatives, eds. Lisa L North and John 
D. Cameron (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Incorporated, 2003), 86; Javier Corrales, “The Backlash 
Against Market Reforms in Latin America in the 2000s,” in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin 
America, 2nd ed. Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter, eds. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2003), 91. 
82 John Nellis, Rachel Menezes, and Sarah Lucas, “Privatization in Latin America. The Rapid Rise, 
Recent Fall, and Continuing Puzzle of a Contentious Economic Policy,” Center for Global Development; 
Policy Brief 3, no. 1 (2004): 1. 
83 Werner Baer, and William Maloney, “Neoliberalism and Income Distribution in Latin America,” 
World Development 25, no. 3 (1997): 314. 
84 Manuel Agosin, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1995), 4–5. 
85 Laurence Whitehead, Latin America: A New Interpretation (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 165. 
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solutions were to face the developing rural crisis by implementing heavier reforms of the 
type already being implemented.86 This meant the continuing privatization of whatever 
enterprises were still public, making financial markets even more liberal, getting rid of all 
barriers to foreign investment and trade, and boosting agricultural exports. Figure 2 
depicts accumulated revenues from privatization from 1990 to 1997.  
 
Figure 2.  Privatization in Latin America and the Caribbean Revenues, 1990–1997 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)87 
While privatization continued throughout Latin America, its implementation 
differed dramatically within Latin America from country to country and from sector to 
sector. Countries including Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay privatized significantly less 
in the 1990s than many other Latin American countries even though these countries had 
large state owned enterprise (SOE) sectors. On the other hand, countries including 
Argentina and Peru raised funds totaling more than 10 percent of their respective gross 
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Progress, Rural Decay: Neoliberal Adjustment Policies and Local Initiatives, eds. Lisa L North and John 
D. Cameron (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Incorporated, 2003), 87. 
87 Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, “Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: Current Trends and Future 
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domestic products (GDPs) from comprehensive privatization programs.88 Some 
countries—including Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia—began privatizing 
small and medium firms89 quickly, developing their programs.90
 
With the implementation of neoliberal reform across Latin America in the 1980s 
and 1990s, countries in Latin American experienced a tremendous inflow of FDI.91 In 
fact, in Latin America, FDI inflows increased almost four-fold since 1985.92 FDI became 
Latin America’s biggest source of foreign capital at the turn of the century surpassing 
what was earned through “emerging stock markets, bank borrowing and other forms of 
external finance.”93 
2. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America 
Naturally, in the privatization process, there will be an important international 
aspect. Privatization involves vital inflows of FDI. In addition to investing in the capital 
of the company, foreign investors commonly take over operations of a company. In Latin 
America FDI flows, in terms of GDP, changed substantially. In 1989, it was 0.3 percent 
and then it grew to 6.9 percent in 1999.94 It was in the late 1980s that most Latin 
                                                 
88 Eduardo Lora, State of State Reforms in Latin America (Herndon, VA: World Bank Publications, 
2006), 271. 
89 Including large infrastructure and energy firms. 
90 Eduardo Lora, State of State Reforms in Latin America (Herndon, VA: World Bank Publications, 
2006), 271. 
91 Manuel Agosin, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1995), 1. “The inflow of FDI represents investments made by foreign residents 
(usually foreign firms) in a particular country over a certain period of time with the purpose of acquiring a 
lasting management interest in the affairs of the enterprise in which the funds are invested. FDI thus 
involves some long-term foreign ownership or control over the decisions made by domestic firms receiving 
the foreign capital.” Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, “Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: Current 
Trends and Future Prospects,” United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
Studies in Trade and Investment no. 43 (2000): 162. 
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and Investment no. 43 (2000): 161. 
94 Jorge Carrera, Daniele Checchi, and Massimo Florio, “Privatization Discontent and Its 
Determinants: Evidence from Latin America” (working paper, IZA Discussion Papers 1587, Bonn, 
Germany: IZA Institute for the Study of Labor, 2005,) 14–15. 
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American countries removed barriers to foreign involvement in services or strategic 
companies. After the restrictions were removed, privatization attracted a significant 
amount of foreign capital. Mexico’s privatization process was enormous in scope as well 
as amazingly successful in limiting the part the state played in a formerly “interventionist 
economy.”95 By mid-1992 more than 350 of nearly 1,200 SOEs had been sold to the 
private sector.96 
However, the increase has not been distributed equally throughout Latin America. 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela are the recipients of a good part of 
the FDI inflow. Almost all of Latin American countries have liberalized regulations of 
FDI to a large degree so much so that countries no longer aim to regulate international 
ventures but instead compete with one another to see what foreign firms they can attract 
to invest in their respective countries.97 
Lack of trust in FDI and in international countries in the 1970s manifested 
through heavy and strict regulation. In the 1970s and 1980s, FDI flows fluctuated but did 
not have a clear tendency to rise. In the early 1990s, however, many of these regulations 
were withdrawn and transformed in order to actively try to attract foreign investment by 
ways of the increasing liberalization in all areas related to international companies’ 
actions in the host countries. The result in the 1990s was that FDI increased 
substantially.98 
This is true throughout most of Latin America although the timing of 
liberalization varied slightly from country to country. Additionally, this trend is not 
isolated to the countries that have received the highest inflows of FDI. Countries like 
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97 Manuel Agosin, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1995), 1–2. 
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Argentina and Chile made changes as early as the mid-1970s whereas countries like 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela made changes in the mid-1980s.99 
In terms of the levels of FDI in flow into Latin American countries, the increase 
in FDI has not been equal in the region. Between 1991 and 1998, as shown in Figure 3, 
Brazil and Mexico, by far, received the most FDI in Latin America.100 Following Brazil 
and Mexico are Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Colombia. Combined, these countries 
received at least 80 percent of FDI inflows to Latin America in 1998. On the other hand, 




Figure 3.  Net inflow of FDI into South America & Mexico, by Country, 1991–
1998 (Millions of U.S. Dollars in Constant 1998 Dollars)102 
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Not surprisingly, the absolute value of Latin American FDI was the biggest for 
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, the largest economies in South America. As seen in Table 
4, Brazil and Mexico received a net amount of roughly U.S. $73 billion and Argentina 
received nearly U.S. $40 billion. Figure 4, however, shows that when determining the 
average yearly net flow of FDI from 1990 to 1998 as a percentage of gross national 
product (GNP), in 1998 Ecuador had the highest percentage for Latin America, with 4.2 
percent.103 Based on this figure, it seems that the Latin American economies that are the 
most open to FDI, in relation to their size, do not necessarily receive the most FDI 
capital.104 
Table 4.   Latin American Inward FDI by Value and as a Share of GNP, by Country 
in Millions of U.S. Dollars105 
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Total Net Flow of FDI, 1990–1998 Average annual FDI, 1990–1998 
Argentina 39,798 4,422 
Bolivia 2,903 323 
Brazil 72,832 8,092 
Chile 25,182 2,798 
Colombia 19,848 2,205 
Ecuador 4,051 830 
Mexico 73,685 8,187 
Paraguay 1,592 177 
Peru 13,825 1,536 
Uruguay 923 103 
Venezuela 17,134 1,904 
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Countries in the region that made adjustments to FDI used some similar methods. 
One basic characteristic of the changes was that new laws gave permission to companies 
with foreign capital basically the same benefits and required the same responsibilities as 
domestic companies. For the most part, international company subsidiaries had full 
access to the host nation’s economy barring a small number of sectoral limitations. 
Foreign companies no longer need to get prior authorization in most Latin American 
countries with the exception of a small number of investment categories.106  
 
Figure 4.  Average Annual FDI from 1990 to 1998 as a Percentage Share of GNP 
in 1998107 
FDI in several Latin America countries are represented in Figure 5, by sector. For 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile, FDI has the largest share of minerals and agriculture. For 
                                                 
106 Manuel Agosin, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1995), 11. 
107 World Bank, World Development Report, 1998–1999 (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 
1999); Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, “Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: Current Trends and Future 
Prospects,” United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Studies in Trade 


















Brazil, Paraguay, and Venezuela, manufacturing FDI is dominant. For Mexico and Peru, 
the majority of FDI flows to the service sector. Colombia has a fairly balanced sectoral 
distribution of FDI.108 
What the above introduction to Foreign Direct Investment shows is that two of the 
most important reasons in Latin America for the increase in FDI are the lifting of 
restrictions on FDI and privatization of state owned enterprises. As a result, in the 1980s 
and 1990s, Latin American countries removed barriers to foreign investment. These two 
points will be demonstrated below with regard to the three cases of focus. 
 
Figure 5.  Sectoral Distribution of FDI into Selected Latin American Countries, 
1995 (Percentage Distribution by Sector)109 
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B. PRIVATIZATION AND OPENING TO FDI: ECUADOR, MEXICO AND 
COLOMBIA 
Having overviewed economic policy from the 1930s to the 1990s covering 
specifically privatization and foreign direct investment in Latin America, the next step to 
furthering this thesis is looking at privatization and opening to foreign direct investment 
in Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia. This will give us the background to understand Latin 
America’s push to privatize ports in these case countries discussed in section C of this 
chapter. 
1. Ecuador 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Ecuador went through similar structural adjustments as 
other Latin American countries, though Ecuador was considered a less aggressive 
reformer compared to most Latin American countries including Colombia and Mexico.110 
Beginning in the early 1980s, in Ecuador, loans were negotiated by the government and 
most were in accordance with the suggested International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank structural adjustment measures. Neoliberal stabilization in Ecuador included 
state reduction and lowering of the deficit, the privatization of state enterprises, the 
liberalization of trade, devaluation, the decentralization of politics, and freeing markets 
from government controls in order to bring Ecuador into the global economy.111 
Ecuadorian adjustments were less severe than those of other Latin American countries. 
Ecuador’s first policies moving in the neoliberal direction were made into law in 
1982. They included a decree to devalue sugar, and the implementation of a large-scale 
stabilization program. Under this program new consumption taxes were imposed, wheat 
and gas subsidies were removed, transportation fares were increased, gas prices doubled, 
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and restrictions were implemented on public salary changes. Changes were made in 
“tariffs, foreign investment, the exchange rate, corporate and individual tax rates, prices, 
the monetary supply, the public budget, subsidies, and land water rights.”112 These 
changes made Ecuador substantially more market-oriented. Despite the comprehensive 
neoliberal transformation in Ecuador, policy makers had not realized their goal of 
developing Ecuador to be ripe for foreign investment, though progress was made.113 
President Borja’s administration (1988–1992) began liberalizing the Ecuadorian 
economy particularly through liberalizing trade.114 Major reforms, however, were 
implemented under President Durán Ballén’s administration (1992–1996).115 The 
restructuring process was accelerated through a new plan called “New Route (Nuevo 
Rumbo): austerity and economic liberalization.”116 Included in this plan was the 
reduction of trade barriers, promotion of development through exports, and privatization 
of important state-run industries.117 The government followed through with its plan by 
restructuring and minimizing social and economic ministries, drastically reducing the 
number of state employees, and creating an Emergency Social Investment Fund, designed 
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by World Bank and IMF, to lessen the effects of structural adjustments on the poor.118 
Despite the new plan, the reforms still did not live up to neoliberal expectations.119 
In December 1996 the Ecuadorian national foreign debt was more than twelve 
billion dollars and the government budget deficit was more than one billion dollars. It 
was at this time that President Abdala Bucaram (September 1996–February 1997) 
publicized the economic policy he would pursue.120 Despite having won the Ecuadorian 
presidency with promises to protect real incomes and create jobs, once in office 
Bucaram’s administration soon raised prices for energy, public transportation and 
telephone rates. At the same time he began to privatize state-owned firms.121 President 
Bucaram passed out money to the Ecuadorian poor, while asking Ecuadorians to endure 
neoliberal reforms as a sacrifice to pay off the national debt owed. Many Ecuadorians 
began to distrust Bucaram because of this coupled with the fact that he had promised less 
severe reform than what was implemented. Both consumers and labor unions were upset 
by the increased prices which pushed them to protest. Bucaram’s administration had to 
deal with opposition from all social classes and geographic regions as a result of both 
Bucaram’s policies as well as accusations of corruption and increasing distrust of 
Bucaram and his administration.122 
In the 1980s and 1990s, there was substantial variation in the reform process that 
Latin American countries took. Though Ecuador did implement neoliberal reform, of the 
three types of reformers, shallow, intermediate and aggressive, Ecuador’s neoliberal 
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reform followed a less aggressive reform process compared to my other case countries, 
Colombia and Mexico. Ecuador’s speed in privatization, deficit reduction, and market 
deregulation was slow and haphazard compared to other reformers in Latin America.123 
2. Mexico 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the role of the state in the Mexican economy was 
redefined by way of an assertive agenda to liberalize trade, promote efficiency, and 
reduce state ownership across sectors.124 Mexico has since substantially privatized its 
public sector. With regard to the scope of the reform program implemented, it is one of 
the biggest worldwide. The economy of Mexico was transformed and after more than 40 
years, state interventionism was reversed.125 
Neoliberal reform was implemented in Mexico with a number of goals. One of the 
main goals was to recreate the financial system into a system based on free-market 
institutions. To accomplish this transformation, the government drastically reduced 
reserve requirements by 1992 and shortly thereafter eliminated them; did away with 
controls placed on interest rates; and privatized banks.126 
In Mexico, FDI restrictions came into existence in the early 20
th
 century when 
foreign majority ownership in steel, cement, glass, automobiles, and mining was 
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substantial liberalization of foreign investment regulations. The 1973 Law to Promote 
Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment created the toughest restrictions on 
FDI after World War II.127 
The way Mexico liberalized its trade and foreign investment was by region. Trade 
and FDI restrictions were first liberalized along the U.S.-Mexico border in the 1960s and 
1970s through the Border Industrialization Plan, which created a free trade zone at the 
border, facilitating FDI and the growth of the maquiladoras in the border region. The 
success of the program influenced the growth of the rest of the country.128 
Mexico’s privatization process began earlier than most other Latin American 
countries and was sustained over a longer period of time. Of the country cases in focus 
for this thesis, Mexico led in privatization through opening basic infrastructure to private 
investment including natural gas, the generation of electricity, satellite communications, 
ports, airports, and railroads.129 The number of state-owned firms decreased from more 
than 1,100 to just over 200 between 1982 and 2000.130  
The macroeconomic goal in privatization in Mexico was to generate funds to 
repay foreign debt while transitioning public ventures into private hands. The 
microeconomic goal of privatization in Mexico was to modernize the firms to be more 
competitive in the international economy. In order to be able to modernize firms the 
Mexican government saw need for 1) investment in new plants and equipment, since the 
government was unable of facilitate it under the conditions of extreme austerity of the 
1980s, and 2) to give rights over land back to their owners by making labor contracts 
more “flexible.”131 The Mexican government saw privatization in large businesses as the 
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comprehensive reorganization of labor contracts to prevent workers from obstructing 
management initiatives with regard to production organization. 
This privatization in Mexico occurred during the de la Madrid, Salinas and 
Zedillo sexteños (six-year term in office) in three distinct phases. The different 
administrations implemented privatization differently, particularly in terms of the state 
agencies used to privatize public companies and the characteristics of the companies that 
were privatized. The de la Madrid and Salinas administrations both used centralization of 
control within the Treasury Ministry, which led to the creation of the Unit for Divesture 
of Parastate Entities (UDEP.)132 Centralizing the power gave officials within the Ministry 
of Treasury and Public Credit (SHCP) the ability to separate those that challenged the 
privatization process and weaken their ability to resist privatization through withholding 
resources of the firm. The Zedillo administration, on the other hand, centralized authority 
over privatization to special teams, created using members of the SHCP, and placing 
them in “strategic locations” within specific ministries.133 
President de la Madrid took office from the end of 1982 until 1988. The mid-
1980s crude oil—Mexico’s leading revenue source—price collapse drove the government 
to abolish licensing, quotas and reference pricing and tariffs were lowered from 100 
percent in the early 1980s to a maximum of 20 percent prior to 1988.134 With the debt 
crisis and the need to restore confidence, both foreign and domestic private investors 
were expected to improve the situation. Thus, privatization became the most important 
aspect of the strategy to pay off debt, reform public finances, and get back the trust of the 
private sector.135 During this time period, privatizations remained mainly one of three 
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kinds. The first was simple, small sales of companies. The second kind was the 
liquidations of the belongings of companies that were not viable. And the third kind was 
“extinctions, the legal elimination of fideicomisos and other funds that existed only on 
paper.”136 
President Salinas took office from 1988 until 1994. Unlike the De la Madrid 
office that aimed to gain the trust of private investors through producing an environment 
conducive for such trust and in hope of restoring stabilizing development, the Salinas 
office was far more explicit in its dealings with key private investors to the point of—
only two weeks into his presidency—electing a businessman as presidential adviser to 
foreign investment against the deep rooted tradition of keeping businessmen out of 
office.137 Soon it became common for businessmen from large private firms to have 
access to top executive positions in office, unheard of prior to Salinas in 
postrevoluntionary Mexico.138  
Reformers in the Salinas administration worked with the help of agent banks, 
international consulting firms, structural adjustment loans and technical support from the 
World Bank. They took on larger and even more complex privatizations compared to the 
de la Madrid administration, selling some of Mexico’s biggest public firms.139 From 
1990 until 1993 UDEP sold “two steel mills, a fertilizer plant, a diesel truck and engine 
plant, Telmex (the telephone monopoly), and the state-run television corporation.”140 
Additionally, UDEP finished the sale of a large number of public firms that began during 
the de la Madrid administration. These privatizations include Mexicana de Aviación and 
                                                 
136 “Government officials reported that the number of public firms reported in 1982 was actually an 
exaggeration because it included firms that existed only on paper, thus making the number of firms 
privatized during this initial period an exaggeration as well,” Dag MacLeod, Downsizing the State: 
Privatization and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform in Mexico (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2004), 
76. 
137 Hector E. Schamis, “Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin 
America,” World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 255. 
138 Hector E. Schamis, “Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin 
America,” World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 255–256. 
139 Dag MacLeod, Downsizing the State: Privatization and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform in Mexico 
(University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2004), 82–83. 
140 Dag MacLeod, Downsizing the State: Privatization and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform in Mexico 
(University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2004), 82–83. 
 45 
the rest of the sugar mills. Of note, though leaving control over the larger companies in 
Mexican investor’s hands, frequently the Salinas administration permitted foreign 
investors to participate as minority shareholders. 
Though the privatization process began under De la Madrid, privatization under 
Salinas was instrumental in restructuring private commercial groups as well as forming a 
new alliance between the private sector and the Mexican government. Most SOEs were 
auctioned—raising U.S. $20 billion—to private businesses that met technical, financial 
and operational standards limiting participation mainly to large businesses.141 The 
economic clout spread through the Salinas process of reform solidified the budding 
political connection between the Salinas administration and key private corporations 
developed, primarily as Schamis describes “on the basis of benefits distributed selectively 
among firms and sectors throughout the liberalization experiment.”142 
The Zedillo administration was in office from 1994 until 2000. It privatized a 
number of firms that had been considered “natural extensions of the policies of the de la 
Madrid and Salinas administrations.”143 The target of these privatizations was the energy 
sector and the communications and transportation sector. 
A close look at both privatizations and the requirements of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) reveals that Mexico did not open its markets without 
restrictions. NAFTA came into effect in 1994 after Mexico sought a free trade agreement 
with the United States—broaching the idea in 1990—with the goal “to stabilize the 
Mexican economy and promote economic development by attracting foreign direct  
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investment, increasing exports, and creating jobs.”144 Control of large privatized 
companies in banking, telecommunications and airlines remained with Mexican 
nationals. 
Along the same lines, NAFTA’s Annex I designated many new privatized 
activities to Mexican nationals only.145 For example, the sale of gasoline, diesel, 
lubricants, oils, or additives, in addition to the transportation and storage of petroleum 
gas, is only allowed by Mexican nationals.146 Additionally, non-Mexicans are not 
allowed to own more than 25 percent of a company that provides commercial air 
service.147 Non-Mexican ownership in cable television and agriculture may not exceed 
49 percent. And finally, getting concession from the Ministry of Communications and 
Transportation to provide stevedoring and warehousing services at ports, or to build and 
operate roads for transportation over land, was reserved exclusively for Mexican 
nationals.148 
One way Mexico’s privatization process is different from other Latin American 
countries is in who actually carried out the privatization process. The Mexican state relied 
heavily on the resources and personnel of the private sector to privatize public firms. 
Many important tasks were contracted out to private actors in the privatization process. 
MacLeod references Haggard and Kaufman’s argument that a good portion of the 
“technical expertise in financial restructuring, rehabilitating companies, and preparing 
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them for divestiture” that are crucial to privatizing public enterprises were really provided 
by “agent banks and private consultants to the Mexican government.”149 
3. Colombia 
To set the stage for the time period in focus of this thesis—the early 2000s—this 
sub-section overviews privatization and opening to FDI in Colombia from the 1970s 
through the early 2000s. During the 1990s, after the majority of Latin American countries 
experienced a debt crisis, Colombia maintained a strong economy characterized by steady 
growth and little debt. What helped Colombia to avoid experiencing a debt crisis was 
customarily conservative fiscal and monetary policy along with its continuity in policy 
and a slow but sure diversification of its exports. Despite this, Colombia encountered 
vulnerabilities that other Latin American states were also experiencing.150 
The increase of coffee export revenues in Colombia in the 1970s lessened the 
effect of the 1982 debt crisis. However, the relief was only momentary requiring in 1984 
the implementation of a macroeconomic stabilization program.151 Following another 
spike in coffee prices in 1986–1987 the state departed from its traditionally pragmatic 
and gradual approach and instead chose a more extreme approach in 1988 to put into 
place a more robust stabilization program.152 The Barco administration (1986–1990) 
implemented grand institutional reforms and hastened the opening of the Colombian 
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economy in the early 1990s.153 Liberalization was implemented through the promotion of 
market competition and deregulation.154 Privatization was a key tool used for economic 
restructuring and to assist privatized state-owned firms to be more competitive with 
private firms.155 
The Colombian government began a robust liberalization program prompted by 
the Washington consensus.156 The continued execution of neoliberal reforms under the 
administration of President César Gaviria (1990–1994) included privatizing key 
sectors—such as banking and telecommunications—and trade liberalization while at the 
same time announcing the implementation of significant political and drug related 
programs.157 Using the distraction of the drug war and reforms of the constitution 
President Gaviria implemented substantial reforms without much focus from either 
congress or the people. 
All in all, Gaviria relaxed import barriers, reduced and rationalized reserve 
requirements, freed most interest rates, eliminated exchange controls, liberalized imports, 
reformed labor legislation, relaxed FDI regulation, deregulated the financial sector, 
modified legislation governing port operations, liberalized the insurance industry and 
modernized the tax system.158 The goal of the Gaviria economic reforms was for the state 
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to play less of a role in and thereby stimulate the economy.159 The effect of opening to 
FDI in the 1990s was shocking. Both the agriculture and manufacturing sectors 
experienced a crisis as a result of privatizations, including price drops of major exports, 
such as coffee, an increase in competition from other countries and worsening security 
situations.160 
A crucial element of reform in Colombia was the approval of a new constitution 
and congress in 1991.161 With the new constitution and congress came the appointment 
of a civilian defense minister and substantial headway was made with peace negotiations 
with the guerilla movement.162 On the other hand, the constitution included spending 
provisions and assurances of social services with no consideration for how to fund or 
implement them.163 Concurrently there was a reduction in the central government’s fiscal 
prudence and influence on the economy.164 These factors coupled with the liberalization 
led to a drop in domestic production leaving the unskilled worker with less legitimate 
options for employment.165 
The economy plunged into crisis by 1998 which was a reflection of President 
Gaviria’s open-market policies and the inability of the institutions to adjust to the 
                                                 
159 Laura Spagnolo, and Daniel Munevar, “After Years of (Economic) Solitude: Neoliberal Reforms 
and Pay Inequality in Colombia” (UTIP Working Paper 47, The University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 
2008), 4. 
160 For more on Economic reforms in Colombia see Table 2 in Laura Spagnolo and Daniel Munevar, 
“After Years of (Economic) Solitude: Neoliberal Reforms and Pay Inequality in Colombia” (UTIP 
Working Paper 47, The University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 2008), 6. 
161 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 44; Laura Spagnolo and 
Daniel Munevar, “After Years of (Economic) Solitude: Neoliberal Reforms and Pay Inequality in 
Colombia” (UTIP Working Paper 47, The University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 2008), 4. 
162 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 44. 
163 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 44. 
164 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 44. 
165 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 44. 
 50 
economic and political changes both in Colombia and worldwide. 166 Unemployment sky 
rocketed with the doubling of labor costs in the 1990s coupled with the misalignment of 
workers’ skills with employer’s needs making the recession in 1999 the worst since 
1930.167 
The Colombian government had not restored confidence in its economy 
throughout the 1990s.168 According to Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñeres, President 
Gaviria’s reforms “may have laid the groundwork for growth, but without a clear and 
comprehensive plan to deal with the violence, sustained and substantial growth was 
unlikely.”169 Generally, the economy remained stagnant until after President Uribe’s 
(2002–2010) aggressive position on security problems which reestablished trust in the 
economy.170 By 2005 FDI in Colombia increased substantially having received the third 
highest amount of FDI in the region.171 
The liberalization process in the Colombian privatization and opening to FDI 
included reforms to treat foreign investors the same as Colombian investors. They 
removed controls on remittance of profits and capital and they permitted foreign 
investment in most sectors.
172
 For the most part, participation in the privatization of SOEs 
was open to foreign investment without additional restrictions. Growth in liberalization 
was the greatest in telecommunications, accounting/auditing, energy, mining, and tourism 
and less so in legal services, insurance, distribution services, advertising, and data 
                                                 
166 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 44. 
167 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 44. 
168 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 45. 
169 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 45–46. 
170 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 45. 
171 Jennifer Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, Sheila Amin, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 46. 
172 United States Department of State, 2011 Investment Climate Statement—Colombia, Bureau of 





 The exception was in certain sectors, including maritime agencies and 
shipping, in which foreign investors were subject to restrictions and exceptions. The 
specific restrictions to maritime agencies and shipping limited the percentage stake 
foreign investors could hold and is discussed further in the port section specific to 
Colombia as it relates to the thesis. 
C. LATIN AMERICAN PUSH TO PRIVATIZE PORTS 
As discussed in chapter III, in the early 1990s Latin American countries, 
including Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia, began balancing their budgets, managing 
inflation and keeping reasonable goals, laying the base for a more sound economic 
foundation. Interest in ports grew with growth in trade, and more attention was given to 
port activities in Latin America. President of the Alexandria, Virgina-based American 
Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), Erik Stromberg commented, “I think as political 
changes evolve… ports are then viewed as critical. Ports and transportation infrastructure 
are a critical strategy in a country’s effort to reach a critical balance of trade. Attention 
has to be paid to port management.” 174 
Raul Urzua Marmbio, the director of Empresa Portuaria de Chile (Chile’s 
National Port System) and, as of September 1993, chairman of AAPA, wrote of his goals 
as Chairman using Chile as an example for other Latin American countries to follow. He 
wrote of Chile’s ports “stripping off state-held enterprises in privatization that has 
resulted in well-run ports and tremendous growth in export products….”175 He viewed as 
important, the integration of Latin American ports, many of which were already going 
through privatization and subsequent modernization efforts. 
With increasing traffic through ports comes greater demand on the port which 
puts more pressure to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of a port. In Latin 
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American, in the early 1990s, port leaders began looking to examples of what has worked 
and what has not worked in ports throughout Latin America.
176
 One example of port 
privatization in Latin America that was examined was in Chile’s move to end the 
monopolization of stevedoring and influence more direct investment.
177
 Following 
Chile’s example, smaller countries including my case countries of Colombia and Ecuador 
also looked to decentralize the national port authority and privatize port services 
respectively. Also following Chile’s example, my remaining case country Mexico, took 
on one of the most ambitious port reform programs in Latin America, comprehensively 
selling off its water fronts. This program included the dismantling of Puertos Mexicans, 
the federal port authority, and created integral port administrations (called 
Administracion Portuaria Integradias (APIs)), not unlike the autonomous port authorities 
in the United States.
178
 
Discussed previously in the section defining ports with regard to degree of public 
or private participation, most ports in Latin America, previously wholly owned and 
operated by the state, opened them to private investment, both domestic and foreign. 
Turning to the countries in my case study we see that this is true of Ecuador, Mexico, and 
Colombia. This section will, for each case study country, give a description of the 
countries’ respective ports in terms of the degree that they each opened to privatization 
and FDI. 
1. Ecuador 
As outlined above, Ecuador did not implement aggressive neoliberal reforms to 
the extent that Argentina, Chile, Peru, or Mexico did, but Ecuador did open its ports to 
private investment. Until 1995, Ecuador’s four main commercial ports were state owned 
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 The government believed that for its ports to be able to 
compete with other ports in the region that were privatized, Ecuador would have make 
changes. 
As a result, Ecuador distributed the management of its ports, giving individual 
ports the ability to promote them and to pursue joint ventures (JV) with private entities 
already experienced in port management. This shift eliminated direct government 
involvement from decisions related to port operations. Ecuador opened its ports to private 
investment in 1995 when the Ecuadorian Government chose to implement the landlord 
port model in its four state-owned commercial ports and port services were put up for 
concession to private companies.
180
 
Esmeraldas port, on the northern coast of the country facing the Pacific Ocean, 
led the other ports in the concession process, having already attracted private 
partnership.
181
 The Port Authority of Guayaquil (APG), created in 1985, was the sole 
administrator, operator, financier, and planner for the Port of Guayaquil, Ecuador’s 
primary port.
182
 APG in particular initiated a three step modernization plan for 
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 The first step consisted of the privatization of all services that were to 
date provided by the port authority. The second step was a complementary step and 
involved the renewal of legislation of Ecuador’s ports, particularly focusing on the 
reduction of red tape.
184
 The third step was the concessioning of Ecuador’s ports, to 




Figure 6.  Major Ports In Ecuador 
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In 1999, a concession was granted, and its three terminals, the bulk terminal, 
container terminal and multi-purpose terminal, began operating privately.
186
 The 
Bananapuerto terminal was operated by Naportec, the Fertisa Terminales was acquired by 
the private company Grupo Empresarial Wong and Vopak Ecuador was managed by the 
Dutch multinational company Royal Vopak Group.
187
 The other ports, including Bolivar 
(located in the Province of El Oro.), and Manta (located in the city of Manta with direct 
access to the international navigation routes)
 
followed the concession trail beginning with 
the promotion of their respective ports to attract private interest.
188
 HPH won a 
concession to expand and operate the port of Manta and as of 2006 been working on a 
project in the port of Manta to expand the port.
189 
2. Mexico 
As a result of the strict central government control of the unions and stevedoring 
operations that ran the port terminals, along with the extensive corruption within port 
operations, Mexican ports were inefficient. In the 1990s Mexico introduced an aggressive 
decentralization program that led to the country’s major ports being concessioned to 
private operators.190 A port law was passed in August of 1991 to permit private 
stevedores to operate terminals through concessions and negotiate the associated labor 
contracts, thus reversing the strict central government control of its waterfront.
191
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The federal government contracted private stevedoring companies in the hope of 
improving cargo handling operations including faster loading and unloading of cargo and 
a reduction of mishaps. Then, in the summer of 1993, the Mexican Congress passed the 
General Ports Act to introduce regulation to every aspect of Mexico’s ports. Also out of 
the act came the creation of APIs.
192
 Subsequently, in September of that year, 27 private 
terminal concessions were announced at ports around Mexico.
193
 In February 1994, APIs 
were established in two of the largest container ports in Mexico, the ports of Manzanillo 
and Veracruz. The Port of Ensenada also established the Port Authority of Ensenada, SA 
de CV (Sociedad Anonima de Capital Variable (Spanish for Variable Capital Company)), 
in June of 1994.  
The goal of APIs was to make the transition from inefficient labor practices to 
efficient practices smooth, through the creation of privately run terminals that would 
negotiate labor contracts with new unions that would have to compete for contracts.
194
 
The APIs were seen by the Mexican government as an essential stepping stone towards 
complete privatization. They were initially funded entirely by the central government. 
The legal responsibility of the APIs was to pay fees and plan and direct individual port 
development and then ultimately phase themselves out of existence by selling shares to 
private concerns when the ports were operating more efficiently.
195
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terminal operator to buy shares in the port, they had to have a long-term master plan for 




On Mexico’s Pacific coast is the Port of Manzanillo, one of Mexico’s busiest 
ports. The port authority for Manzanillo (API de Manzanillo) was created in 1993. The 
port authority for the Port of Veracruz, the Administracion Portuaria Integral de Veracruz 
(APIVER), was established in 1994. Both APIs were awarded a 50 year concession at 
their respective ports for the management and operation of buildings and facilities. The 
APIs managed and operated the ports, terminals and port facilities through third 
parties,197 chosen through public bids.198 Subsequently, the APIs would transfer these 
responsibilities to new private port managers. 
In the summer of 1995 divestment—a unique process of port management—
began when the Mexican government awarded to private cargo handlers the operational 
concessions of its most strategic and largest ports. Ingenieros Civiles Asociadoz 
(Associated Civil Engineers - ICA), Mexico’s largest construction company, was 
awarded the concession at the Port of Veracruz (Gulf Coast), Mexico’s largest and 
busiest port.
199
 A Mexican construction company, REMACONST, was awarded the port 
of Altamira (Gulf Coast).
200
 A JV between Mexican Maritime Transport (TMM) and 
U.S.-based Stevedoring Services of America Inc. were awarded two docks at the Port of 
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Ispat Mexicana, a steel company, was awarded the Port of 
Lázaro Cárdenas (Pacific Coast), where most of the cargo handled would be loading steel 
at the docks with limited container traffic anticipated since this port would mainly be 
used by the steel mills Ispat Mexicana and Sicartsa.
202
 
Despite the fact that the Mexican government remained the single owner of the 
infrastructure facilities, it sold all of its port-related equipment to the new port managers. 
The government opened to this different way of managing its ports and handed over 
economic risk to private port operators.
203
 While concessions lasted from 15 to 30 years, 
the Mexican government could at any time withdraw the concession should the 
concessionaire either mismanage the port or not fulfill the contract and follow through 
with the concessionaire’s proposed master plan—both of which include building new 




As part of Colombia’s broader privatization process, in the beginning of 1991, the 
enactment of a law changed the country’s ports from SOEs to “private regional port 
societies as concessionaires responsible for administration and management of the 
general cargo ports, established the General Port Superintendent as regulator of the 
concessions, and defined conditions of operation to ensure free and fair competition 
among port societies and among port operators.”205 Colombian ports were privatized by 
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1993 when they were concessioned to different regional port authorities.206 The 
concessions were awarded for 20 years. These authorities did not provide services 
directly; instead they contracted with operators that used the facilities, an arrangement 
characteristic of the landlord port model. 
Colombia opened to foreign private investment in its ports in a more restrictive 
manner than Ecuador and Mexico in that Colombia’s opening to foreign private 
investment restricted both private and foreign investment. Importantly, and unlike the 
Ecuadorian and Mexican cases, Colombian legal structures limit private investment—
including foreign—in ports with the ownership structure of the concession having a 
maximum of 70 percent private ownership. The remaining 30 percent of the ownership 
must be public, with the port infrastructure in particular remaining public. Also unlike 
Ecuador and Mexico, specific restrictions on foreign investment in the port sector exist in 
Colombia. According to article 1490 of Colombia’s Commercial Code, the percentage of 
FDI in maritime entities was restricted to 30 percent. Additionally, in order to own a 
concession to provide port services the entity must be legally established in Colombia as 
a ‘Public Corporation.’207 
In Colombia, the ownership structure varied by port. For example, in Cartagena a 
few local private investors controlled 85 percent of the port society, in Buenaventura 
ownership was dispersed among roughly 210 shareholders and in Barranquilla a few 
private companies held 70 percent of the shares.
208
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This chapter has provided an overview of neoliberal reform in Latin America, 
particularly in the countries Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia. Of these countries, the 
Mexican government was more aggressive in implementing reform, and the governments 
of Colombia and Ecuador were less aggressive than Mexico, with the Ecuadorian 
government having implemented the least aggressive reforms of the three.209 Despite 
this, the governments of all three countries opened their economies to FDI and all three 
governments privatized their respective ports and opened them to foreign investment.210 
Referencing the second section on privatizing and opening to FDI, Colombia, like 
Mexico and Ecuador, saw privatizing many sectors as beneficial to the country’s 
economic growth and stability. In the third section on port privatization what made 
Colombia unique in contrast to Ecuador and Mexico was that Colombia saw the need to 
restrict both foreign and private investment in ports, limiting foreign investors to 30 
percent ownership of a port. This restriction on foreign investment could indicate a fear 
of infringement of national sovereignty, a concern not seen in the laws associated with 
Ecuador and Mexico opening to foreign private investment in their ports. As a result of 
this opening to private investment both the Ecuadoran and Mexican ports were invested 
in by non-domestic firms.  
Now that we have a preliminary understanding of the way that Ecuador, Mexico 
and Colombia privatized and opened to foreign investment, including with regard to their 
respective ports, we can examine why these countries’ ports would be attractive or not 
attractive for private investment by Chinese companies. Chapter IV will cover Chinese 
overseas investment methods and constraints. 
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IV. CHINESE OVERSEAS FOREIGN INVESTMENT: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR PORT INVESTMENT 
Chapter III laid out the methods through which Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia 
opened to investment and opened therefore to the potential for China to invest in these 
countries, including in the port sector. As a second step in examining how strong the 
alignment has been between how Chinese companies invest overseas and the policies of 
Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia in opening to investment, this chapter looks at the 
Chinese side, analyzing how Chinese OFDI policy has developed and more importantly 
how this development has shaped the processes used by Chinese companies in venturing 
to invest overseas. Then chapter V will begin with a focus on Chinese port management 
companies laying out how these companies have invested overseas and in particular in 
the Latin American ports in Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia. Chapter V will finish with a 
recap of the policy governing the Latin American case countries ports, to explore how the 
alignment between Ecuadorian and Mexican policies, on the one hand, and Chinese 
OFDI policy, on the other, are much stronger than the China-Colombia alignment, 
explaining the lack of Chinese investment in Colombian ports. 
This chapter seeks to lay out the development of Chinese OFDI and examine how 
the opportunities and constraints of China’s OFDI development have had an impact on 
how Chinese companies invest overseas. It starts with an overview of China’s OFDI 
policy development. The first subsection outlines China’s relations with the developing 
world from the cold war onward as a historical backdrop. The next subsection begins 
with an introduction to China’s OFDI policy development. The discussion on OFDI 
policy continues in the third subsection, defining the actors involved in the development 
of China’s OFDI policy. The fourth subsection details the process through which Chinese 
OFDI developed in its three stages: phase 1 from 1979 to 1990 “Initiation”, phase 2 from 
1991 to 2001 “Unstable development.” and phase 3 from 2002 until the present “Rapid 
and steady development.” Finally, section two lays out how Chinese companies invest 
overseas as a result of the constraints of Chinese OFDI policy encountered by the 
companies facing foreign markets for the first time. 
 62 
A. CHINA’S OFDI POLICY DEVELOPMENT  
For the most part, throughout the world, research on FDI is prevalent. However, 
research on Chinese FDI, particularly government initiated FDI, is far less common.211 
According to World Investment Report 1998, despite having the largest outflow of FDI 
since the early 1990s, there is limited academic notice in English literature of China’s 
offshore plants and outward FDI despite the popularity of FDI as a topic.212 
Further, depicting Chinese overseas investment accurately is difficult considering 
the plethora of Chinese investments that are run through tax havens leaving its ultimate 
destination indiscernible.213 This, coupled with the multitude of definitions used by 
different countries of what foreign direct investment is, pinpointing Chinese OFDI gets 
further complicated.214 Additionally, statistics from MOFCOM and SAFE only reflect 
foreign investments that undergo the approval process in China and receive approval, 
leaving projects not officially approved but still executed out of these statistics.215 
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Changing definitions of what FDI is from one year to another and/or changes in how the 
FDI is reported in some countries make FDI trend analysis near impossible.216 Taking 
into account these limitations a discussion of Chinese OFDI follows in an attempt to 
analyze the investments of Chinese companies overseas, particularly in ports in Ecuador, 
Mexico and Colombia. 
1. Historical Backdrop: China’s Relations with the Developing World 
from the Cold War Onward 
Before delving into the development of Chinese OFDI, a historical synopsis of 
China’s relationships with the developing world will help place the examination of 
Chinese OFDI within the timeline of its overall relations with the world. During the cold 
war, the basis for China’s relationship with the developing world was a mixture of 
ideology and practical foreign policy interests. China viewed the U.S. and Soviet Union 
as hegemonic powers and relied on its commonality with the “third world” to set itself 
apart from the U.S.-Soviet Union rivalry. In 1953 the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence was drafted, which served as the framework for Chinese foreign policy. 
According to Mitchell, the five principles namely, “mutual respect for territory and 
sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful coexistence,” not only appealed to China, but would appeal to all 
developing countries around the world that experienced the burden of Western 
colonialism.217 
Parting with this previously shared view with postcolonial governments in the 
developing world, the 1960s were characterized by significant Chinese moral and 
material support to violent communist revolutionary movements in Africa, Asia, and 
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Latin America.218 In supporting these communist movements, China sought to be the 
global leader of international communism—competing with the Soviet Union both 
geopolitically and ideologically.219 In the late 1970s China dealt with the developing 
world more pragmatically through the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Deng 
Xiaoping, and his efforts to lessen the importance of ideology in Chinese national policy. 
In the 1980s China stopped supporting communist rebellions and started establishing 
political and economic relations with developed and developing countries. In order to 
garner capital, increase its influence, and demonstrate its pledge to foster relations with 
the developing world, China began support to countries such as Algeria, Iran, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Syria militarily by sharing, among other things, nuclear technology 
and missile systems. 
In the 1990s China maintained a policy of pragmatism and economic 
liberalization slowly building important economic ties and political relations with several 
countries despite recent Chinese aid to revolutionary insurgent movements in those 
countries. Chinese diplomacy changed from “hard-edged, uncompromising, and 
unsubtle” principles to a more amenable and charming face.220 
2. Introduction: Chinese OFDI Policy Development 
The decision to allow Chinese OFDI came with relatively substantial state 
control—largely through SOEs—ensuring OFDI would meet China’s long-term 
development goals with the broader strategy for economic nationalism focusing on the 
acquisition of energy, ensuring security of China, geopolitics and Chinese 
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competitiveness 221 In China, 1978 marked the beginning of 30 years of economic reform 
with the initiation of Chinese “Open-Door” policies.222 With the goals of changing the 
national organization and integrating the Chinese economy and its businesses into the 
global economy, China has become significantly more important as a source of FDI to 
developing countries. Prior to 1978 China’s economy was a closed planned system. With 
economic reforms came a “two economic systems, one country” setup in the 1980s and 
into the mid-1990s, only to move from that setup to a “much more market-based 
economy.”223 China’s OFDI developed in a similar manner. Discussion of the actors 
involved in Chinese OFDI and its three major periods of development in the following 
sections, show how changes in regulation and policy during this time period had a 
significant impact on OFDI in particular. Furthermore, with the institution of the 1999 
“Go Global” policy even more support has been given to OFDI by the substantial 
changes in OFDI regulation which have played a role in the increase of Chinese OFDI 
since 2000. 
3. Actors 
China underwent substantial changes in its 30 years of economic reform. These 
changes were laden with ambiguity of roles and responsibility, which—coupled with the 
plethora of government agencies involved—meant that inadvertently the institutional 
framework could serve to hinder the processes it was meant to help facilitate, namely the 
development of Chinese investment overseas. Several important political and 
administrative actors in China encroached upon Chinese OFDI development. Outward 
investing companies first had to face the laws and regulations established by these 
government actors to put together a business plan for investing overseas and then again 
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during the overseas investment approval process. This discussion in this section of the 
actors involved with OFDI policy development is meant to help clarify who the actors 
were, when they were active and what roles they played in OFDI policy development. 
This ties in with the larger thesis in that these actors were directly involved in shaping 
what a Chinese company would have to do in order to be able to invest overseas. 
There are four levels into which these key central government actors can be 
categorized, with the top level having the most power and broadest influence in terms of 
the number of sectors influenced, and the lowest level, the least power and narrowest 
influence. The key actors include the State Council, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF), and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).224 The levels 
into which each actor is categorized are stated in the descriptions of the different actors 
below. 
The State Council, at the top, is responsible for managing the country’s 
government as well as major decisions involving the Chinese economy and society. It is 
the most powerful body in the Chinese central government for outlining and developing 
policies, laws, and regulations, and for coordinating national economic growth. It deals 
with foreign affairs and completes bilateral treaties.225 Additionally, the State Council 
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though the policy proposals may have been generated by a lower organization, for 
example SAFE or MOFCOM.226 The State Council ultimately outlines the long term plan 
for all of China’s OFDI. 227 
SAFE, NDRC, and MOFCOM make up the next level. They are subordinate to 
the State Council though they may also issue specific policies. They are responsible for 
the management of overseas investment.228 SAFE has been in existence since 1979 and 
administers the usage and flow of foreign exchange. It was initially under the Bank of 
China then from 1982 onwards was under the new central bank, the PBC.229 Under both 
the Bank of China and the PBC, SAFE was fairly independent. This changed with 
restructuring of the government in 1998. 
The NDRC, formerly the State Development and Reform Commission, functions 
as the key government organ in the design, regulation and coordination of Chinese 
economic development and industrial policy.230 The NDRC also played an important role 
in the approval of investment overseas through its responsibility to keep equilibrium in 
balance of payments.231  
MOFCOM was instituted in its existing structure and role in 2003, though its 
predecessor organizations, MOFTEC and MOFERT, have been shaping Chinese OFDI 
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policy and regulation for much longer.232 MOFCOM’s responsibilities provide it with 
both direct and indirect influence and guidance over the extent and focus of Chinese 
OFDI. MOFCOM issued the first Chinese OFDI regulation in 1984. According to Voss, 
Buckley and Cross, the main responsibility of MOFCOM in relation to Chinese OFDI 
includes oversight on Chinese OFDI through producing and putting into effect policies 
and regulations and determining if a non-financial OFDI project is worthy of approval. 
MOFCOM also is responsible for making sure Chinese law aligns with international 
treaties and agreements and for the coordination of China’s “foreign aid policy and 
relevant funding and loan schemes.”233 
Despite the State Council being the most powerful agency involved in the 
development of OFDI, NDRC, MOFCOM and SAFE were the most important agencies 
in OFDI policy development based on the involvement each agency had in producing 
policy. Since the 1980s, they produced at least 56.1 percent of these policies. However 
even though State Council only produced 5.9 percent of policy, it had a tremendous 
influence on OFDI policy as discussed later in the chapter.234 
The PBC, MOF, and CSRC make up the third level. They have the responsibility 
of a variety of fields including finance and taxation. At this level, the departments 
involved are primarily responsible for helping to ensure that the upper ministries 
coordinate policies with other policies already in existence and to help in issuing and 
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implementing policies.235 The PBC, MOF, and CRSC played an important role to 
Chinese OFDI policy having produced 20 percent of policies issued regarding overseas 
investment.236  
The fourth and lowest level consists of subordinate departments to each ministry, 
for example the ministries responsible for mining, agriculture and forestry. They are 
subordinate to the upper ministries, and are responsible for policies in their respective 
sectors but have less influence on determining overseas investment within their 
respective sectors. The departments at this level have key responsibilities though since 
they are the main agencies in charge of implementing these policies for their respective 
sectors at the lowest level. 
The complexity of the political and administrative actors as explained above is a 
result of and reflects the multitude of reorganizations of the government system in China 
to facilitate the evolution of the Chinese economic system from a planned system to a 
market based system.237 Because the delineation of responsibility of each of the actors 
was not always apparent and because of the continuous change in the reform process, 
coupled with the many government agencies involved in the process potentially with 
opposing interests both between and within these same government agencies it is easy to 
see how this institutional framework could hinder the overall development of Chinese 
OFDI and discourage smaller SOEs and privately-owned companies all together.238 
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It is evident that over the past 30 years part of the intent of Chinese economic 
reform has been to encourage private companies. Throughout the reform process, the role 
of the private company has grown substantially, becoming a significant part of China’s 
economy as well as frequently gaining the confidence and ability to delve into and 
undertake foreign business opportunities.239 However, an important factor in private 
companies’ willingness to venture to invest overseas is influenced by the policies put in 
place, discussed in the next section. Though the process was laden with bureaucracy, the 
overarching goal of the Chinese government—through policy development and 
implementation by various actors at differing levels of government—was to encourage 
individual companies to make overseas investments. The stages in China’s OFDI policy 
development in the next section show the transition from more restrictive to less 
restrictive policies on China’s OFDI.  
4. Stages in China’s Overseas Investment Policy Development 
There have been three stages in the development of China’s overseas investment 
policy. In the first stage OFDI was limited to SOEs. In the second stage the Chinese 
government loosened up its restrictions and its OFDI began to grow. The second stage of 
the OFDI policy development from 1991 until 2001 sets the policy in China for the 
Chinese port management companies, in focus for this thesis, to be able to invest 
overseas in the early 2000s. The final stage covers the period during which China 
actively promoted OFDI and includes the rapid expansion of its OFDI. 
From 1979 to 2001—the first two stages of Chinese overseas investment 
development—there were roughly four new policies per year. This was even a low 
number compared to the prior years. With the economic planning system and its 
restrictive management there was a lack of investment stimulation and consequently there 
was very little investment activity. Despite their restrictive management system and with 
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the increase of focus in the national economy on overseas investment it was then, in the 
third stage, when the Going Out strategy was officially developed.240 
Based on the research available, we can see that over the past three decades a 
gradually increasing number of Chinese companies have looked overseas to invest. 
Manufacturing companies were even encouraged by the Chinese government to invest in 
other countries. This was a deliberate and strategic move to organize transnational 
activities.241 Chinese OFDI policies have been varied in terms of regularity over time and 
strategic objective. 242 The flows of Chinese overseas investment since the 1980s can be 
divided into three different stages, 1) initiation from 1979 until 1990, 2) unstable 
development from 1991 until 2001, and 3) rapid and steady development from 2002 until 
present. 243 
a. Phase 1: 1979–1990 Initiation 
As a result of the political effects of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), China 
shifted its national development strategy to concentrate on growing and renewing the 
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economy.244 In the 1980s and 1990s when increasing market liberalization and support of 
private enterprise was characteristic, most companies still operated within the institutions 
of the state economic planning system. Their activities were controlled by government 
regulations which were “within the general rubric of the ‘socialist market economy’ 
reform process” according to Wenbin and Wilkes.245 Overseas investment was dealt with 
carefully and only certain state-owned companies were afforded the chance to invest 
overseas.246 Additionally, due to limited foreign exchange reserves and very rare 
overseas investments, investment flows were small, on the average of less the U.S. $0.9 
billion per year.247 
The first phase can be organized into two distinct time periods: 1979–1982 and 
1983–1990.248 Before 1983, OFDI approval was very centralized in Beijing, with all 
overseas investment projects requiring approval by the State Council.249 The period from 
1979 to 1982 was a cautious phase.250 The first official Chinese OFDI regulation was 
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issued in the State Council’s “Fifteen Economic Reform Measures in August, 1979.”251 
Though the 13th measure clearly states “It is permitted to set up enterprises in foreign 
countries,”252 because of inexperience in investing overseas and minimal foreign 
exchange reserves, overseas investment was strictly controlled and there were very few 
authorized overseas investments.253 In this period, the State Council examined all 
Chinese international investment projects and was the approving authority. 
From 1983 to 1990 investment overseas was enthusiastically encouraged by the 
Chinese government relative to the previous period 1972–1982. It was encouraged by 
way of the implementation of many policies favorable to facilitating the investment 
activities of SOEs by four levels of key central government actors. Prior to 1983, the 
State Council primarily processed individual cases for overseas investment and there was 
no standard procedure in place. However, in 1983, the administration of and authority to 
approve overseas investments was decentralized by the State Council to MOFTEC at the 
ministry level.254 
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MOFTEC also laid the groundwork for the process for joint-ventures to invest 
overseas in 1983.255 The procedures for approval were loosened for small projects and 
projects in which the materials were from China or the equipment was made in China.256 
In order to establish a joint-venture overseas, which would entail a project costing U.S. 
$1 million or more (other than projects from Hong Kong and Macau), the Chinese 
investor had to first go through investing firms’ supervising authority at the level of the 
municipal, provincial, or autonomous regional government departments, then go through 
the responsible agencies of the destination of investment and after all this MOFTEC 
would decide whether to approve it or not.257 For smaller projects—i.e., those less than 
U.S. $1 million—the relevant department within the investing company could seek 
approval directly from the Chinese Embassy.258 Despite loosening of restrictions and the 
implementation of policies favoring Chinese OFDI, from 1986 to 1990 Chinese OFDI 
was only U.S. $9.2 million per year.259 
In 1985, a MOFTEC publication defined the basic administration system of 
Chinese OFDI by changing the examination and approval of individual cases to a 
standardized approval procedure. The publication was called “Approval procedures and 
administrative method for establishing non-trade management JVs overseas.” It 
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(Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2009), 38. 
 75 
simplified the procedure, shortened the approval time, defined the conditions for foreign 
investment and pointed out that the right to overseas investment was not restricted to 
certain enterprises.260 
The years 1984 and 1985 showed rapid expansion in overseas investment.261 
Capital outflow from China nearly tripled that of the previous five years with a total of 
U.S. $130 million.262 However, this stage was still considered an experimental stage.263 
In fact, until 1985 only 143 Chinese companies were established overseas having 
invested a mere U.S. $170 million (less than three percent of China’s inward FDI).264 
Roughly 20 Chinese companies established operations overseas, for the most part in the 
service sector and in particular Chinese restaurants primarily in the major cities or 
Chinatowns of the host countries including the United States, Japan and Thailand.265 
Overseas investment in other service sectors, including construction and shipping, was 
mainly located in Hong Kong and Macao.266  
The success of the experimental stage of investing prompted the Chinese 
government to be more aggressive with outward investment. So much so that the mid-
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1980s were characterized by even more rapid growth of OFDI that was facilitated by the 
central government through simpler and less restricted OFDI policy on non-trade-related 
OFDI.267 As a result more than 600 new Chinese companies invested at least U.S. $860 
million in more than 90 countries.268 Roughly 100 new companies were established 
annually, a drastic increase compared to roughly 20 in earlier years. China’s number of 
TNCs compared to the global total remained insignificant, but it was still tremendous 
growth for China. While the number of TNCs in the world grew at a rate of 29 percent 
annually, China’s grew at 42 percent.269 
Overseas operations for China changed in this stage and began to transition from 
Chinese restaurants to the exploitation of natural resources.270 While other service sectors 
such as assembly and transport were important during this stage, the projects in natural 
resource development dominated China’s overseas investment agenda.271 Some of the 
most significant natural resource exploiters were large Chinese SOEs.272 Though Chinese 
investors were mostly attracted to investing in developed countries, 18 percent of newly 
established overseas companies were in Africa, 50 per cent were in Asia.273  
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The role of SAFE in approval of investments overseas was instituted from two 
documents it published.274 In 1989 SAFE issued the policy “Foreign exchange 
management method for overseas investments” and in 1990 put in place implementation 
regulations.275 Before seeking approval from MOFCOM, SAFE, based on the resources 
certification provided by the company, would evaluate the risk of investment by 
reviewing the company’s foreign exchange resources through the foreign exchange 
management system for Chinese investment overseas.276 
If the risk was acceptable and permission was granted by MOFCOM, next, the 
company had to file a significant amount of paperwork with SAFE, including the 
MOFCOM approval, the foreign exchange resources review, the project contract and 
certification information having to do with the amount of foreign exchange, if the 
company was transferring foreign exchange out of the country. Additionally, SAFE 
required that companies retain five percent of foreign exchange as a profit deposit.277 
According to Wenbin and Wilkes, “This regulation was in force for more than 10 years 
and had a strong influence on foreign exchange management.”278 
In 1989, two significant publications were issued to fortify accounting 
management, “Temporary management method for foreign trading, financial and 
insurance companies” 279 by PBC and “Temporary method for non-trade foreign 
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exchange accounting management for overseas units” by MOFCOM.280 These 
publications contained regulation that outlined the extent of state-owned capital, benefit 
sharing processes and accounting administration methods for companies with 
investments overseas and complemented the developing overseas investment 
management system.281 
The increase in investment overseas by China in the 1980s is only partially 
explained by these policies.282 With the inflexible and complex application and approval 
process, the interest of Chinese companies was limited to a certain degree.283 With that 
said, though, these policies were integral in establishing the foundation for China’s 
overseas investment management system.284 MOFCOM and SAFE were recognized as 
the key players and their influence continued for the next two decades.285 The period 
from 1984 to 1991 was characterized by an increase in FDI of up to U.S. $0.2 billion 
each year and an increase in the amount of investment by each enterprise to U.S. $1.4 
million.286 
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b. Phase 2:1991–2001 unstable development 
During this time period there was a significant increase in the total amount of 
Chinese investment overseas which manifested China’s movement towards overseas 
investment opportunities for Chinese business. However, because economic growth 
instead was given priority, investment flows were unstable with substantial fluctuations 
over the years. From 1991 to 1992 overseas investments went from just above U.S. $0.9 
billion to U.S. $4 billion. Through 1993 the investment level remained stable but it 
declined 50 percent in 1994 to U.S. $2 billion. From 1995 to 1998 there was a steady 
increase, but then it dropped in 1999 to the level of investment in 1991.287 Though there 
were numerous complex factors that contributed to this instability, alterations in policies 
during this stage played a key role.288 
Phase 2 has two distinct periods as well. During the first period, from 1991 to 
1998, there were numerous restraining policies issued by the Chinese government and the 
Chinese government increased its control over large investments. During the second 
period, from 1999–2001, the plan to “‘Develop international economy cooperation and 
trade” was initiated and associated policies were published.289 This encouraged the 
progress of investment overseas in processing and assembly businesses.290 
(1) Phase 2a: 1991–1998 
As a result of the increased Chinese OFDI of the previous phase, the period was 
characterized by unfocused and unrealistic investments which frequently failed and ended 
with the capital being stolen by key personnel from the failed company who would then 
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flee abroad.291 These occurrences manifested the inadequacies of international 
management at the company level as well as the flaws of China’s OFDI administrative 
system.292 As a solution, the approval procedures for OFDI (including investment in 
Hong Kong and Macau) were revised in 1991 with the “Notice on Strengthening the 
Control of Foreign Investment.” During this time period there were numerous policies 
put in place. Table 5 depicts each policy instituted, the governing body that instituted it 
and what the intention and result of the policy was.  
Unlike the previous period, which was characterized by resource hunting, after 
1991 the Chinese government chose numerous mature manufacturing sectors to set up 
overseas operations.293 Also, during the 1990s when international trade and cooperation 
was encouraged, numerous private enterprises were also granted import and export 
licenses and took part in overseas investments in processing and assembly.294 Reforms in 
the system encouraged private investment overseas and unambiguously legalized their 
role.295 As such, in the initial reform of the approval system of foreign exchange 
management, private companies were actually treated the same as SOEs.296 
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Table 5.   Analysis of China’s Overseas Investment Policies297 
Year Org. Published Purpose/Result 
1991 State Council “Opinion on the 
National Planning 
Commission reinforcing 
control of overseas 
investment projects.” 
Control investments overseas; 
made approval requirements 
stricter for large investments; 
changed application and 
approval process transferring 
some of the approval authority 
for investment overseas from 









proposals and feasibility 
reports for overseas 
investments.” 
Declared NPC’s significant 
role in approving investments 
overseas; highlighted 
importance of the 
development and approval 
investment project proposals, 
feasibility reports and State 
Council’s approval 
implementation regulation 
  SAFE “Circular to unify the 
specification of 
overseas investment risk 
and foreign exchange 
resource reviews.”‘ 
In response to the State 
Council’s “opinions;” 
standardized the application 
materials required for review 
1993 SAFE “Specification of 
overseas investment risk 
and foreign exchange 
resource reviews.” 
To fine-tune the foreign 
exchange approval process 
based on the “Opinion’ 
1992 MOFTEC “Temporary regulations 




To strengthen control over 
“non-trade overseas 
companies” 
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Year Org. Published Purpose/Result 
1996 MOF “Temporary method on 
overseas accounting 
management.” 
To regulate and supervise the 
accounting management of 
overseas projects 
 
The procedures of examination and approvals for OFDI put in place in 1991 
strengthened control over OFDI, in particular with regard to large-scale foreign 
investment, compared to the 1985 system.299 For projects less than U.S. $1 million (small 
projects) there were more steps with review by three departments rather than two. For 
projects more than U.S. $1 million there were more steps with review by five 
departments rather than three.300 Additionally, the examination went into more detail 
including project proposals, feasibility reports, contracts and statutes.301 But, at the same 
time, provincial governments were given the authority to give approval for projects of 
less than U.S. $1 million.302 In this system, investments of less than U.S. $1 million were 
able to get permission from MOFCOM and its local branches within three days and 
underwent simplified approval procedures.303 
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Accompanying the energized economy from 1989–1992 was recession and 
inflation.304 In the meantime, it became apparent that the number of investments overseas 
that failed was growing and lack of restrictions caused significant loss in state owned 
capital. 
MOFTEC began drafting the “Regulation on the Administration of Chinese 
Overseas Enterprises” in 1993 to improve the administration of the increasing number of 
overseas investments.305 MOFTEC was made the manager of the examination and 
approval process and was made responsible for the administration of overseas enterprises 
and OFDI policies. NDRC was made the manager of the examination and approval of 
project proposals and the feasibility reports of overseas investments.306 MOFTEC 
approved the economic and commercial department in Chinese embassies which 
subsequently managed the administration of Chinese enterprises overseas. 
(2) Phase 2b, 1999–2001 
This time period served as a transition phase for China’s Going Out Strategy. The 
Chinese government published numerous favorable policies with their growing 
appreciation of the significance of investment overseas and recognizing the potential for 
driving development within the domestic economy.307 
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Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, Chinese outward trade was a 
significant economic growth point for China due to its increasing contribution to the 
Chinese economy. The crisis had a serious effect on China’s exports with the fall of 
market demand in Southeast Asia in the second part of 1998. The competiveness of 
Chinese merchandise was reduced due to the weak currencies of Southeast Asia against 
the comparatively strong Yuan. The Chinese government’s solution to this problem, as 
well as promoting economic development domestically, was to take advantage of less 
expensive overseas labor and raw materials. This solution indirectly enhanced investment 
overseas.308 
In order to benefit from China’s advantage in some industries, to encourage 
exports and to hasten changes to the industrial structure, the State Council published 
“Opinion on Encouraging Companies to Carry Out Overseas Material Processing and 
Assembly.” 309 This policy document returned the authorization rights for overseas 
investment to MOFTEC from the NPC. The return of authority to MOFTEC eradicated 
some previously strict restraints.310 Following the implementation of the policy, overseas 
investment processing and assembly increased leading to overseas processing and trade 
becoming a new point of Chinese economic growth. Later, twelve policies were 
published by MOFTEC and other relevant departments to promote the development of 
overseas processing and assembly operations. Each of these policies addressed different 
aspects of investing overseas, to include finance and taxation issues.311 
When, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 15
th
 Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party held in 2000, the decision to initiate the Going Out Strategy was made, 
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the “Suggestion to Develop the 11th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development” was published.312 In the “‘Suggestion” processing, trade, resource 
extraction, and project contracting were listed as the four main investment types to be 
promoted and it was proposed to offer policy for investment overseas support in the form 
of credit, insurance and other helpful services.313 According to Wenbin and Wilkes, “The 
11th Five Year Plan outlined policy directions for the following five years and created a 
sound environment for overseas investment.”314 The Going Out Strategy was integrated 
with the “Outline of the 11th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development” in 2001. Highlighted were seven needs: 
 to encourage overseas investments to enhance China’s competitiveness 
and expand the scope and modalities of China’s international economic 
and technical cooperation; 
 to continue to develop overseas project contracting and labor service 
cooperation, and encourage competitive companies to explore processing 
and trading overseas, thereby promoting export of products, services and 
technology; 
 to support companies in exploring resources overseas that were in short 
supply domestically and promote adjustment of the sectoral structure of 
resources trade; 
 to encourage the use of foreign intellectual property resources to establish 
research and development and design operation centers overseas; 
 to support capable companies in developing transnational operations to 
achieve internationalized development; 
 to improve the overseas investment service system and create a good 
investment environment for companies through improvements in systems 
governing finance, insurance, foreign exchange, taxation, intellectual 
property rights, laws and regulations, information services and entry and 
exit management; and 
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 to improve corporate governance structures and internal regulatory 
mechanisms to regulate and supervise overseas investments.
315
 
According to Wenbin and Wilkes, “This document marked the birth of China’s 
Going Out strategy and the comprehensive development of China’s overseas 
investments.”316 Furthermore it laid the foundation for policies over the next 10 years 
and marked the beginning of a new phase of Chinese investment overseas. The 
substantial growth in Chinese investment overseas consequently drew a significant 
amount of attention.  
(3) Phase 3:2002–PRESENT Rapid and Steady Development 
At the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Beijing in 
2002, then President Jiang Zemin (1993–2003) emphasized the significance of overseas 
investments in the broader national reform and liberalization strategy. Zemin 
“encouraged and supported companies with comparative advantages to make overseas 
investments in order to promote commodities and labor service exports as means of 
establishing competitive multinational companies and international brands.”317 As a 
result of the 16th Congress, China changed its overseas investment policy process and 
currently issues policies to promote the growth of the development of Chinese investment 
overseas. 
Putting into practice these policy measures strengthened China’s regulatory 
activities and improved the profitability of Chinese overseas companies, particularly from 
2006 onward. Though there was an increase in the number of investments that failed 
during this time period, generally speaking the policies implemented during this time 
period had a tendency to be very good for OFDI. The final stage was set in motion by 
China’s central government’s formal announcement of the Going Out strategy. In 2000, 
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when the Going Out strategy was announced, there was a higher frequency of OFDI 
related policies issued—an increase of greater than 15 a year since 2002.318 The aim of 
most of these policies was to encourage overseas investment. Their implementation were 
important in stimulating the more recent Chinese investment overseas and OFDI flows 
increased substantially during this period, an increase of more than 2000 percent, from 
U.S. $2.5 billion to U.S. $56.5 billion.319 
B. CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Having given a brief historical background on China’s relations with the 
developing world beginning with the cold war, then having detailed the OFDI policy 
development in China, in order to understand why Ecuador and Mexico received Chinese 
investment while Colombia did not, this section motivates the thesis by overviewing how 
Chinese companies invest overseas as a result of the policy development of Chinese 
OFDI and foreign investing environments. 
During the initial development of Chinese foreign investment, the Chinese 
government encouraged large SOEs to venture abroad to develop their operations 
internationally, while strictly restricting the investment of private companies.
320
 Private 
companies were lacking experience in international business,
321
 and most of them did not 
have any distinct competitive advantages over foreign competitors and usually faced 
more obstacles than SOEs.
322
 For example, in contrast to the experience of SOEs, 
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Chinese private companies were not offered support from the Chinese government in the 
form of information, legal assistance, or consulting support.
323
 
The turning point in Chinese OFDI policy development was during the 1990s 
when the Chinese government began supporting Chinese private companies investing 
overseas. As discussed in the section on Chinese OFDI policy development, we know 
that as a part of China’s economic opening, in the 1990s China promoted international 
trade and cooperation through reforms in the system that encouraged private investment 
overseas and unambiguously legalized the role of private investors overseas. As such, for 
the first time in the initial reform of the approval system of foreign exchange 
management, private companies were actually treated the same as SOEs. 
Recapping discussion from the stages of China’s OFDI policy development, 
however, there were many conditions making it more difficult for private Chinese 
companies to invest overseas, especially Chinese companies that were small or medium 
in size. In particular, compared to SOEs, private Chinese companies ran into extensive 
administrative difficulties in building international endeavors to include the intricacy and 
strictness of the approval process.
324
 In order to operate internationally, frequently these 
companies looked for shelter under the cover of an SOE and were obligated to pay a fee 
in return.
325
 Most private companies continued to use a foreign trade agency—a liaison 
that connects a company to a distributor or end user in a foreign country—resulting in a 
higher cost of business as well as a higher risk of business secrets being leaked.
326
 
Financial support was also lacking. Typically import and export banks were 
important in financing OFDI. However, some bank loan policies, like those of China 
Eximbank, were geared toward financing large companies with notable reputations, 
                                                 
323 Li Zhaoxi “China’s Go Global Policy,” in Chinese Multinationals, ed. Jean-Paul Larçon 
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essentially ignoring small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs).
327
 Lastly, SMEs typically 
did not have information about foreign markets and foreign investment opportunities, a 
further impediment to investing overseas.
328
 
In order to cope with the still harsh investing environment, it was common for 
Chinese private companies to follow one or more of four common processes when 
investing overseas. One process included exporting to a particular market prior to 
investing in that location, which allowed the company to analyze the unfamiliar market 
and business setting, to gain experience, to raise financial resources and then decide 
whether to invest and settle locally.
329
 Another process involved the company entering 
the unfamiliar market as a joint-venture initially, and then seeking 100 percent ownership 
and control of a company.
330
 This process of overseas investment allowed the company to 
first learn how business is done locally, then take over full control of the venture, and 
maybe even expand in the local market.
331
 A third process used was to begin with a 
labor-intensive product before transitioning to a technology-intensive product. With this 
process the company first built the production capability in China, taking advantage of 
their low labor cost. Then, after raising capital and developing competitive advantages, 
the company went abroad to sell more technology-intensive products.
332
 Finally, a fourth 
process commonly used is investing first in emerging markets before investing in 
economies already developed. Because of lower risk of failure and lower management 
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costs Chinese companies have used comparatively less developed markets in Asia, Latin 




This chapter focused on the development of Chinese investment overseas, 
important to determining if this development is in alignment with the methods through 
which Ecuador, Mexico, and Colombia opened to investment consequently opening them 
to the potential for China to invest in these countries’ ports. The first subsection gave a 
brief history of China’s relations with the rest of the world beginning with the cold war. 
Next, the second subsection began with an introduction of important actors in Chinese 
foreign investment policy development. MOFCOM and SAFE were the most important 
agencies to the development of Chinese overseas investment policy having produced 
more than 50 percent of related policies.  
We also see that the State Council had a substantial influence on OFDI policy 
despite producing less than six percent of the actual policy. The process required to 
obtain approval for investing overseas involved several institutions with the key players 
being the State Council, MOFCOM, SAFE and the NDRC. Despite numerous 
modifications and changes during the 30 years of opening up, the basic steps and actors 
remain the same.334 The company wanting to invest overseas first applied to SAFE to 
obtain permission to use foreign exchange revenue overseas. Once the financial aspect 
was approved, the company then applied either to MOFCOM or to the NDRC to obtain 
approval for the business project aspect of the venture overseas.335 
In the fourth subsection we see the complexity of the development of Chinese 
OFDI policy, which can be described in three stages. In the initial stage, policy dictated 
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that only SOEs were allowed to invest abroad. In the second stage came looser policy 
restrictions which allowed Chinese OFDI growth to include the allowance of private 
Chinese companies to engage in overseas investment. And finally the last stage was 
characterized with active promotion of Chinese OFDI resulting in the rapid expansion of 
Chinese OFDI. Despite the gradual loosening of restrictions on overseas investment, due 
to the complexity of the development of Chinese OFDI bureaucracy in getting approval 
for OFDI ironically served to hinder the same development it was designed to encourage. 
Finally, section two lays out how Chinese companies invest overseas as a result of 
the constraints of Chinese OFDI policy encountered by the companies facing foreign 
markets for the first time. A recap of four processes Chinese private companies use when 
investing overseas to endure the highly regulated, potentially unfamiliar investing 
environment follows: 1) exporting first to an unfamiliar market in order to garner 
knowledge of the setting and raise capital while determining suitability of investing 
directly at that location; 2) enter the unfamiliar market in a JV then as familiarity is 
gained move toward 100 percent ownership and control of the JV; 3) produce a labor-
intensive product domestically to raise capital and develop competitive advantages before 
investing overseas to sell a more technologically advanced products; and finally 4) 
investing in a new market as a test bed before investing in developed markets.
336
 
Chapter V will re-examine the hypothesis previously introduced to discuss why 
the hypothesis is valid in explaining Chinese investment in the Latin American ports in 
Mexico and Ecuador, and an absence of Chinese investment in Colombian ports in the 
1990s. The hypothesis is if the way Latin American countries opened their ports to 
investment aligns with how Chinese overseas investment developed you will have 
Chinese investment in their respective ports in the early 2000s. To do this, chapter V will 
give an overview of the two Chinese port management companies in focus for this thesis, 
COSCO Pacific and HPH. Then there is a history of these companies to include their 
OFDI activities and finally their OFDI activities in my case countries. The final section 
will draw out similarities and differences in how Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia opened 
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to foreign investment as compared particularly to methods Chinese companies used to 
invest overseas to show why we find Chinese foreign investment in the 2000s in Mexico 
and in Ecuador, but not in Colombia. 
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V. THE ALIGNMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN PORTS OPENING 
TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
FROM CHINESE PORT MANAGEMENT COMPANIES 
Having Chinese investment in a Latin American port depends on the Latin 
American port being open to how the Chinese company invests overseas. In other words, 
how a Latin American country opens to foreign investment will either align with how the 
Chinese company invests, in which case you will have Chinese investment in the Latin 
American Port, or it will not align, in which case you will not have Chinese investment in 
the Latin American Port. Chapter III covered the process by which port privatization 
occurred in Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia. Chapter IV demonstrated the importance of 
the development of China’s OFDI policy in directly influencing the coping mechanisms 
used by Chinese companies investing overseas entering foreign markets. Knowing the 
mechanisms used by Chinese companies to invest overseas leads us into the 
demonstration of Chinese port management companies using these mechanisms in their 
OFDI, specifically in the ports in Latin America, which will be covered in this chapter.  
Chapter V will show that the ports in Ecuador and Mexico opened to foreign 
investment in a way that aligned with how HPH invested overseas resulting in HPH 
investing in Ecuadorian and Mexican ports. It will also show that the way that Colombia 
opened its ports to foreign investment did not align with how HPH and COSCO invested 
in ports overseas; therefore there is no Chinese investment in Colombian ports. The 
chapter begins with an overview of the Chinese port management companies in focus: 
COSCO and HPH. The overview will include a background on the companies and 
continue with their respective OFDI activity. 
The second section outlines COSCO and HPHs investment activities in 
Ecuadorian and Mexican ports in the early 2000s. The chapter and thesis will conclude 
by showing how Chinese port investment companies followed common overseas 
investment practices while investing in the ports in Ecuador and Mexico. Comparing and 
contrasting Ecuadorian, Mexican and Colombian reception of foreign and private  
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investment in relation to how China invested overseas during the early 2000s will show 
whether these countries’ ports would align in their reception of Chinese investment or not 
align. 
A. CHINESE PORT MANAGEMENT COMPANIES 
HPH and COSCO Pacific are the two Chinese port investment companies in focus 
for this thesis due to their significant overseas direct investment in foreign ports. The 
following section will give an overview of each company and then will detail each 
company’s progression from its initial emergence into port management to how each 
company made the move to investing overseas. This will set us up for the conclusion 
which explains the lack of investment by COSCO in Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia and 
it explains the investment of HPH in Ecuador and Mexico but not in Colombia. 
The origin of a port management company influences the goals of the company, 
as discussed in the private port management section of chapter II. Understanding the 
origins of a port management company will give us insight into the goals of the company 
and subsequently what motivates the company. Understanding the environment the 
company is operating in, discussed in the Chinese foreign investment section in chapter 
IV, and business strategy of a company will help us understand decisions made by the 
company and for the purpose of this thesis, the choice of location of investment in port 
terminals. The next subsection details COSCO Pacific and HPH background first then 
covers each company’s overseas foreign investment.  
B. COSCO PACIFIC BACKGROUND 
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO)—owned by the People’s 
Republic of China—was established in 1961 engaging in transportation solutions. It 
became a shipping company in 1993.337 It is currently the second largest integrated 
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shipping company in the world.338 China COSCO Holdings (China COSCO) was 
established in March 2005 and is a subsidiary of COSCO. China COSCO’s subsidiaries 
provide a myriad of services spanning the entire shipping logistics chain both 
internationally and domestically including shipping and leasing of terminals and 
containers.339 See Figure 7 for organizational structure of China COSCO and its 
subsidiaries. China COSCO specifically manages its terminal and port services through 
COSCO Pacific.340 
  
Figure 7.  China COSCO’s Organizational Structure341 
COSCO Pacific is considered China’s largest terminal manager and operates 
terminals at the Chinese ports of Dalian, Yingkou, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shanghai, Taicang, 
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Zhangjiangang, Nanjing, Yangzhou, Ningbo, Xiamen, Quanzhou, Shenzhen, Guangzhou 
and Hong Kong.342 In addition COSCO Pacific, considered one of the top terminal 
managers in the world, managed terminals in major ports in Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Singapore and Egypt in 2010.343 Considering that COSCO Pacific’s 
operations began in China and a significant portion of their operations are in China their 
operations domestically are important to mention for reference for further discussion of 
COSCO Pacific’s port operations and port choice though the discussion will focus on 
their operations overseas. See Table 6 for a summary of COSCO Pacific’s domestic 
operations and overseas operations. 
Table 6.   COSCO Pacific’s Terminal Companies, Domestic and Overseas344 
Terminal Companies Shareholding 
Bohai Rim 
Qingdao Qianwan Container Terminal Company Limited 20% 
Qingdao New Qianwan Container Terminal Company Limited 16% 
Qingdao Qianwan United Container Terminal Company Limited 8% 
Qingdao Qianwan United Advance Container Terminal Company Limited 5.6% 
Dalian Port Container Terminal Company Limited 20% 
Dalian Automobile Terminal Company Limited 30% 
Tianjin Port Euroasia International Container Terminal Company Limited 30% 
Tianjin Five Continents International Container Terminal Company 
Limited 
14% 
Yingkou Container Terminals Company Limited 50% 
Yangtze River Delta  
Shanghai Pudong International Container Terminals Limited 30% 
Shanghai Xiangdong International Container Terminal Company Limited 10% 
Ningbo Yuan Dong Terminals Limited 20% 
Zhangjiagang Win Hanverky Container Terminal Company Limited 51% 
Yangzhou Yuanyang International Ports Company Limited 55.59% 
Nanjing Port Longtan Container Company Limited 20%  
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Terminal Companies Shareholding 
Pearl River Delta and South East Coast  
COSCO-HIT Terminals (Hong Kong) Limited 50% 
Yantian International Container Terminals Limited 14.59% 
Yantian International Container Terminals (Phase III) Limited 13.36% 
Guangzhou South China Oceangate Container Terminal Company 
Limited 
39% 
Quan Zhou Pacific Container Terminal Company Limited 71.43% 
Jinjiang Pacific Ports Development Company Limited 80% 
Xiamen Yuanhai Container Terminal Company Limited 70% 
Overseas 
Piraeus Container Terminal S.A. 100% 
Suez Canal Container Terminal S.A.E. 20% 
COSCO-PSA Terminal Private Limited 49% 
Antwerp Gateway NV 20% 
 
C. COSCO PACIFIC OFDI 
COSCO Pacific began its overseas operations when it entered a JV with PSA 
Corporation Limited. The JV formed is the COSCO-PSA Terminal Private Ltd (CPT.) in 
which COSCO Pacific had a 49 percent stake.345 It was formed to jointly manage and 
operate two berths at Pasir Panjang Terminal in Singapore commencing on November 1, 
2003.346 CPT was also responsible for the construction and operation of two additional 
terminals. By 2008, the two new terminals built by CPT were not only operational, but 
were cohesive and integrated with the rest of PSA operations through shared advanced 
technology.347 COSCO Pacific went on to set up operations in Egypt (2004) with a 20 
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percent stake, in Belgium (2004) with a 20 percent stake and in Greece (2008) as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary (See table 7.) 
The new overseas operations in the form of three new JVs and one new WO 
subsidiary benefited COSCO in many ways. Relevant to this thesis these newly 
established operations served COSCO Container Lines Company Limited (COSCON), a 
sister company to COSCO Pacific—through the provision of exclusive and quality 
services at the terminals managed by COSCO Pacific according to COSCO’s press 
release concerning the new terminal management.348 
Table 7.   Timeline COSCO Pacific Major Milestones349 
2003 First Overseas JV to operate COSCO-PSA Terminal Private Limited COSCO-
49% interest 
2004 JV to operate SCCT, Egypt COSCO APM-55% COSCP Pacific-20% Suez Canal 
Authority & Affiliates-10.3% National Bank of Egypt-5% Egyptian Private 
Sector-9.7% 
2004 JV to develop and operate Antwerp Gateway terminal, Belgium DP World-
42.5%, Zim Ports-20%, Cosco Pacific-20%, Terminal Link/CMA-CGM-10%-
and Duisport-7.5% 
2005 Antwerp Gateway Terminal Opens 
2008 Piraeus Container Terminal SA wholly-owned subsidiary of COSCO Pacific 
Limited 
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1. No COSCO Pacific Investment in Latin America 
COSCO Pacific used all four coping mechanisms for investing overseas, 
discussed in chapter IV. First, COSCO Pacific typically entered a JV when managing a 
new terminal overseas, as was laid out earlier in this chapter. Above we see that three out 
of four of COSCO Pacific’s overseas operations were through a JV.350 Second, COSCO 
Pacific built its terminal/port management capabilities within China before looking to 
expand overseas, also discussed earlier, allowing COSCO Pacific to gain experience and 
knowhow and improve procedures and technology, then put that experience and 
knowhow and the improvements into practice beginning with CPT. Third, COSCO 
Pacific also—technically—followed the process of investing first in an emerging market 
(China) before investing in already developed markets (Singapore, Greece, Egypt 
Belgium).351 Finally, COSCO Pacific invested in four ports along its sibling company, 
COSCON’s, established trade route in Singapore, Belgium, Egypt and Greece. This 
behavior is last coping mechanism—to export first to an unfamiliar market, and then 
expand there once knowledge of the local market and customs has been acquired. 
COSCO Pacific’s methods for choosing ports to invest in did not align with 
investing in any Latin American ports in the 2000s due to one of the coping mechanisms 
used by COSCO Pacific in investing overseas.352 In analyzing the coping mechanisms 
used, the first three coping mechanisms described above would align with COSCO 
Pacific investing in Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia. It is the fourth mechanism discussed 
here that does not align. Because COSCO Pacific has followed the behavior expected of 
an ocean carrier terminal/port management company, discussed in the chapter III, since 
COSCON does not have major established trade routes in Ecuador, Mexico and 
Colombia, we also do not see COSCO Pacific investment in these countries. See Table 7 
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overseas that HPH did. 
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for container terminals under the responsibility of COSCO Pacific and Table 8 for 
established trade routes of COSCON and Appendix A for examples of COSCON routes. 
Table 8.   COSCON Major Route Services353 
Asia-America Services Asia-Europe Services Asia-S. Africa/S. 
Americas Services 
All Water/US E. Coast Express 1 Aegean Sea Direct Express Asia/S. Africa/S. 
America  
All Water/US E. Coast Express 2 Asia/Europe Weekly Express 
2 
Far East/Africa Express 
All Water/US E. Coast Express 3 Asia/Europe Weekly Express 
3 
 
All Water/US E. Coast Express 4 Asia/Europe Weekly  
E. China/US S.W. Coast Express Asia N.W. Europe Weekly   
N. China/US S.W. Coast Express Adriatic Feeder  
China/Central America Express Asia Med Express  
Taiwan/Korea/US S.W. Coast 
Express 
Asia Med Pacific Service  
Japan/U.S/ NW Coast Express Asian Mediterranean Service  
Japan/Pacific S.W. Coast China N. Europe Express  
S.E. Asia/US S.W. Coast Express E. Med Express  
S. China/US N.W. Coast Express Med/W. Africa   
N.+E. China/US N.W. Coast Express Asia/Europe Services  
Pacific S.W. Coast/Asia   
Shanghai/Ningbo/Pacific S.W. Coast   
S. China/US S.W. Coast Express   
Taiwan/US N.W. Coast Express   
Taiwan/Pacific S.W. Coast Service   
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The origins of the Hutchison Port Holdings date back to 1866 when the 
Hongkong and Whampoa Dock Company was established for the provision of services in 
ship construction and repair.354 Over the next 100 years, Hongkong and Whampoa Dock 
Company expanded into cargo and container-handling operations and international port 
services.355 In 1969 Hongkong and Whampoa Dock Company established HPH to 
manage the newly established Hongkong International Terminals (HIT)—a single 
container terminal in Hong Kong.356 Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL) is established 
in 1977, as a result of a merger between Hutchison International Limited and Hongkong 
and Whampoa Dock Company Limited. In 1979 Li Ka-shing’s Cheung Kong Holdings 
took over HWL. The HWL Group—with interests in countries throughout Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Europe, America, and Australia—then formed Hutchison Port 
Holdings (HPH) in 1994 to “hold and manage the port and related interests of the 
diversified Hutchison Whampoa Limited Group.”357 See Table 9 for HPH milestones. 
E. HPH—OFDI 
HWL’s first investment project outside of Hong Kong was overseas is Felixstowe, 
United Kingdom (UK.) In August of 1991 the Hutchison Whampoa Group acquired 75 
percent of the port in Felixstowe (Trinity Terminal) with the remaining 25 percent 
(Walton Container Terminal) belonging to Orient Overseas Holdings Limited 
(OOHL.)358 In 1993 HWL began improving the terminal with the dredging of the main 
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channel to deepen the channel to at least a depth of 12.5 meters and the addition of one 
million square feet of warehousing to the port through the completion of the construction 
of a warehouse.359  
The following year HWL bought the remaining 25 percent of the port from 
OOHL to give HWL 100 percent ownership of the port.360 The port expansion project 
began to add 630 meters to the Trinity Terminal.361 The roadway connecting the port 
entrance to the main highways nearby was completed and opened. Additional cranes 
were added giving the port the additional capability to service wider container ships.362 
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October 26, 2014 http://www.portoffelixstowe.co.uk/company-information/history/. 
361 “Milestones,” Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed June 25, 2014, 
http://www.hph.com/about/milestone.aspx; “History,” Company Information, Port of Felixstowe, accessed 
October 26, 2014, http://www.portoffelixstowe.co.uk/company-information/history/. 
362 “Milestones,” Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed June 25, 2014 
http://www.hph.com/about/milestone.aspx; “History,” Company Information, Port of Felixstowe, accessed 
October 26, 2014, http://www.portoffelixstowe.co.uk/company-information/history/. 
363 “Milestones,” Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed June 25, 2014, 
http://www.hph.com/about/milestone.aspx; “History,” Company Information, Port of Felixstowe, accessed 
October 26, 2014, http://www.portoffelixstowe.co.uk/company-information/history/. 
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Table 9.   Timeline Hutchison Port Holdings Major Milestones364 
Year Milestone 
1866 Hongkong and Whampoa Dock Company founded as a British hong 
1971 Hutchison International Terminals established and begins operation at Kwai 
Chung in 1976 
1977 Merger between Hutchison International Limited and Hongkong and 
Whampoa Dock Company Limited to form Hutchison Whampoa Limited 
1979 Takeover of HWL by Li Ka-shing’s Cheung Kong Holdings 
1991 Internationalization begins: first overseas terminal project in Felixstowe 
1991/2 Hutchison Westports Limited Established 
1993 First terminal project in mainland China 50/50 JV with Shanghai Intl Port 
Group 
1994 HPH established to oversee all HWL’s port business  
JV with Yantian Port Group to operate the Yantian International Container 
Terminal. Hutchisons DeltaPorts established as one of HPH’s leading 
subsidiary 
1994 HPH acquired a stake in Mid-Stream Holdings.  
1994 JV to operate Shantou International Container Terminals 
1995 JV to operate Jiangmen International Container Terminals  
JV with Bahamian authorities created the Freeport Harbour Company. 
1996 HPH to operate the Ports of Cristobal and Balboa in Panama HPH 90% 
ownership 
HPH acquired a stake in Myanmar International Terminals Thilawa. 
1997 Freeport Harbour Company opens new Freeport Container Port 
1998 Hutchison acquired Thamesport on the Isle of Grain, and Harwich 
International Port 
1999 JV to operate Jakarta International Container Terminals in Indonesia. HPH 
acquired a stake in European Container Terminals. 
                                                 
364 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 
Internationalisation: The Case of the Container Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics 9 (2007): 
19; “Milestones,” Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed June 25, 2014 
http://www.hph.com/about/milestone.aspx; “Baltic Swap,” Dredging and Port Construction (May 2005): 
12; “Growth in the Far East,” Dredging and Port Construction (November 2004): 10; “Hutchison Gets Nod 
on Felixstowe Projects,” The Journal of Commerce (February 6, 2006), 9; Shelley Emling, “Bahama 
Time.” Latin Trade (English) 6, no. 11 (November 1998): 28; John Collins, “Hutchison Open for Business 
in Freeport,” Caribbean Business 29, no. 35 (August 2001): 47; “Hutchison Plans Panama Expansion,” The 
Journal of Commerce (September 2005): 9; ‘History,” Corporate Information, BACTSSA, Buenos Aires 
Container Terminal Services, accessed November 7, 2014, http://www.bactssa.com.ar/en/. 
 104 
Year Milestone 
2001 HPH to invest $1 billion on Panama ports expansion during the next decade 
HPH acquires Buenos Aires Container Terminal SA, Argentina 
2004 JV to build/operate Hutchison Laemchabang Terminal365 with 30-year 
concession 
2005 HPH acquired of a majority stake in Gdynia Container Terminal SA, 
Poland366 
JV to operation Alexandria International Container Terminals, Egypt  
JV to operate Oman International Container Terminal 
 
HPH undertook its first investment in mainland China in 1993 with a JV between 
HPH and Shanghai International Port (Group) Company Limited. (SIPG.) The JV began 
as a 50/50 ownership of the Shanghai Container Terminal Company Limited—
responsible for the operation and management of the container terminal in Shanghai. 367 
HPH formed a JV with the Yantian Port Group in 1994 to form the Yantian Port 
Holdings to jointly operate the Yantian International Container Terminal.368 HPH 
continued investing both in mainland China and outside of China. See Table 9 for a 
synopsis of the most important HPH investments through the mid-2000s. 
1. HPH Investment in Latin America 
From 2001 to 2006 HPH invested in the ports of in Ecuador, and terminals in 
Mexico (See Table 10.) HPH invested in the ports in varying ways detailed below in 
chronological order of when HPH invested in those ports. 
                                                 
365 Hutchison Laemchabang Terminal is a consortium of HPH, Hutchison Ports Thailand and Lexton 
Thailand. 
366 The port was previously called Wonly Obszar Gospodarczy S.A. 
367 Linda TjiaYin Nor, “Hong Kong’s Role in Mainland China’s Logistics Industry,” Asian Survey 51, 
no. 4 (July/August 2011): 666, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2011.51.4.659; James J. Wang, 
Adolf Koi-Yu Ng, and Daniel Olivier, “Port Governance in China: a Review of Policies in an Era of 
Internationalizing Port Management Practices,” Transport Policy 11, no. 3 (2004): 241; “Growth in the Far 
East,” Dredging and Port Construction (November 2004): 10. 
368 Linda TjiaYin Nor, “Hong Kong’s Role in Mainland China’s Logistics Industry,” Asian Survey 51, 
no. 4 (July/August 2011): 666, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2011.51.4.659. 
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Table 10.   Chinese Investment in Case Country Ports 
Joint Venture/Terminal CH Partner/Year Share of CH Investment 





Internacional de Contenedores 
Asociados de Veracruz (ICAVE) 
W-O subsidiary 
Ensenada International Terminal & 
Ensenada Cruiseport Village 
W-O subsidiary 
Lázaro Cárdenas Terminal Portuaria 
de Contenedores (LCT) 
HPH/2003 51% 
Port of Manta HPH/2006 W-O subsidiary 
 
a. Mexico 
The privatization push in Mexican ports discussed in chapter III continued to 
draw the interest of a great deal of foreign investment.
369
 Port development and 
expansion in four major ports in Mexico was undertaken by HPH in 2001, when HPH 
acquired several terminals from the Philippines based International Container Terminal 
Services Incorporated, giving it control of container terminal concessions in Ensenada 
International Terminal SA de CV and Ensenada Cruiseport Village SA de CV at the Port 
of Ensenada in Mexico; Internacional de Contenedores de Asociados de Veracruz SA de 
CV at the Port of Veracruz in Mexico; Terminal International de Manzanillo SA de CV at 
the Port of Manzanillo in Mexico (See figure 8 for port locations.)
370
 HPHs Group 
Managing Director, John Meridith, indicated this acquisition of three additional ports 
helps establish HPH in “highly attractive markets…in which previously we have not been 
involved.” He also stated the intention of HPH to “build on and expand” the successes of 
these ports.371 
                                                 
369 Susan Kreimer, “Arriba! Mexican Ports Enjoy An Infusion of Investment That Should Ensure 
Rapid Growth,” Journal of Commerce no. 38: (2003): 83. 
370 Susan Kreimer, “Arriba! Mexican Ports Enjoy An Infusion of Investment That Should Ensure 
Rapid Growth,” Journal of Commerce no. 38: (2003): 83.HPH also acquired port operations and 
investments in , Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Tanzania and Thailand through this acquisition. 
371 “Hutchison Port Holdings Acquires Overseas Assets of International Container Terminal Services, 
Inc.,” Press Releases, Hutchison Port Holdings, May 28, 2001, http://hph.com/media/press_release.aspx. 
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Figure 8.  HPH Locations in Mexico372 
Additionally, beginning in 2003, HPH bid and won the concession to operate and 
develop the LCT of which it holds a 51 percent stake.
373
 The concession gave HPH 
through the LCT the rights to expand the terminal through the development of a 
previously undeveloped 85-hectare deep-water site. 374 Referencing the acquisition, 
HPHs Group Managing Director also stated “with transfer of HPH’s management 
expertise and advanced systems,” HPH’s goal is to transform LCT into a “world-class 
facility.” 375 
In 2006, HPH Port Holdings began the expansion of the port’s specialized 
container terminal to be completed in 2007 as the first phase of a $200 million investment 
                                                 
372 “Introduction,” Internacional de Contenedores Asociados de Veracruz, Americas, Hutchison Port 
Holdings Limited, accessed November 8, 2014, http://hph.com/globalbusiness/business.aspx?gid=52. 
373 Susan Kreimer, “Arriba! Mexican Ports Enjoy An Infusion of Investment That Should Ensure 
Rapid Growth,” Journal of Commerce no. 38: (2003): 86. 
374 “HPH Launches New US $244 Million Facility at Port of Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico,” Press 
Releases, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed October 27, 2014, http://hph.com/media/press_release.aspx.  
375 “HPH Launches New US $244 Million Facility at Port of Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico,” Press 
Releases, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed October 27, 2014, http://hph.com/media/press_release.aspx. 
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by HPH at the LCT.
376
 In addition to the management and operations of the terminal, 
HPH undertook a container terminal development project to expand the port. Phase one 
of the expansion project had its grand opening in November 2007 (see Figure 9) with the 
remainder of the project to be completed the following year.377 
 
Figure 9.  Aerial view of LCT’s new container handling facility378 
HPH’s group manager stated that with HPH reopening the LCT and modernizing 
it, HPH made the commitment to “transform and expand this terminal into a modern 
container-handling facility.” With the completion of the expansion he states it had in fact 
been transformed into a “world-class container terminal which is outfitted with the latest 
handling equipment, capable of receiving the largest vessels afloat, with all of these port 
infrastructure developments, which are unprecedented in Mexico.” 379 
                                                 
376 “More Competition for US West Coast Ports.” Logistics Today 47, no. 8 August 1, 2006, 12. 
377 “HPH Launches New US $244 Million Facility at Port of Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico,” Press 
Releases, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed October 27, 2014, http://hph.com/media/press_release.aspx. 
378 “HPH Launches New US $244 Million Facility at Port of Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico,” Press 
Releases, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed October 27, 2014, http://hph.com/media/press_release.aspx. 
379 “HPH Launches New US $244 Million Facility at Port of Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico,” Press 
Releases, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed October 27, 2014, http://hph.com/media/press_release.aspx. 
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b. Ecuador 
In November 2006 HPH signed a 30 year concession with the Manta Port 
Authority (MPA) to build and operate a new U.S. $523 million terminal at the Port of 
Manta. Out of the concession a new port operating company was formed; Terminales 
Internacionales de Ecuador SA (TIDE) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of HPH.380 TIDE is 
Ecuador’s only natural deep-sea port and is capable of accommodating the next 
generation of mega-vessels.381 
Both HPH and MPA viewed the venture as beneficial. HPH from the perspective 
of working with MPA to develop the Port of Manta will enable HPH to participate in the 
increasing trade in the region. MPA pointed out the skills brought to the company from 
each entity: TIDE to be a collective of “local market knowledge” and HPH’s “expertise 
in global port management and operations” to facilitate the Port of Manta’s development 
into a leading port in the region. 382 
With the addition of TIDE, HPH’s network of ports has increased to 44 worldwide.383 
This next section will lay out the evidence of these Chinese port management 
companies following the processes suggested in chapter IV as how Chinese investment 
companies invest overseas which aligns. 
 
 
                                                 
380 “HPH Signs Port of Manta Concession,” Press Release, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed 
October 27, 2014, http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/upload/en/media/press/1845_eng.pdf. 
381 “HPH Signs Port of Manta Concession,” Press Release, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed 
October 27, 2014, http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/upload/en/media/press/1845_eng.pdf. 
382 “HPH Signs Port of Manta Concession,” Press Release, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed 
October 27, 2014, http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/upload/en/media/press/1845_eng.pdf. 
383 “HPH Signs Port of Manta Concession,” Press Release, Hutchison Port Holdings, accessed 
October 27, 2014, http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/upload/en/media/press/1845_eng.pdf. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Addressing the subject of Chinese investment in Latin American ports, this thesis 
compared Ecuador, Mexico and Colombia, countries that have privatized their ports but 
that vary in terms of Chinese private and foreign investment in their ports. Chinese 
investment in and degree of trade with Latin American countries vary greatly by country, 
just as Chinese investment in Latin American ports does. A brief look at the cases 
demonstrates that Chinese investment in ports cannot be explained by Latin America’s 
overall openness to FDI, openness to foreign investment in ports, and/or the degree to 
which a country receives Chinese FDI or engages in trade with China. 
Ecuador (a slow, partial reformer) and Mexico (a radical economic liberalizer at 
the national level) are cases of considerable Chinese port investment. Ecuador stands out 
as a country that did not implement aggressive neoliberal reforms, but that did open to 
private, including foreign, investment. The discussion on Ecuadoran port investment 
earlier in this thesis demonstrates that Ecuador also opened itself to 100 percent foreign 
private investment and control in its ports. 
Turning to Mexico, the country’s trade with China increased substantially from 
1998 and 2004, and by 2005 Mexico had become China’s second largest bilateral trading 
partner, with bilateral trade continuing to increase through 2007.384 In this context, it is 
logical that Mexico’s main ports on its Pacific coast were operated by the Chinese port 
management company HPH.385 However, HPH’s investment in the east coast port, 
ICAVE, is curious, given that the control of Mexico’s main port facilities along its 
Pacific coast facilitate easier and cheaper transportation of goods to and from China. 
At a broader level Chinese investment in Mexican ports is interesting as well. 
Despite the growth in trade between the two countries, Mexico remains at a disadvantage, 
                                                 
384 Alejandro Kenny. “China’s Presence in Latin America: A View on Security from the Southern 
Cone,” Military Review 86, no. 5 (Sep, 2006): 61. 
385 “Ports under Mexico,” Hutchinson Port Holdings, accessed December 9, 2010, 
http://www.hph.com/globalbusiness/ports.aspx?selgid=7#Section7. 
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in that the imbalance of trade between the two countries is in favor of China.386 In 
recognizing the negative effects of competition with China, Mexican industry has 
advocated protection from the government against Chinese goods. Considering this, even 
though it is illogical, Mexico not only opened its ports to private foreign investment, it 
also opened its ports to 100 percent private foreign investment and control, without 




Colombian ports had private investments, but none from China. In spite of 
considerable China-Colombia trade—in addition to recent efforts on the part of the 
Colombian government to attract more foreign investment388—none of these investors 
appear to be Chinese. While the earlier discussion of Colombian port investment explains 
that the restriction of Colombian port ownership and investment is limited to roughly a 
70/30 split between the private and public sectors, further restrictions apply to foreign 
private investors. Foreign private investors are limited to only 30 percent ownership 




While this restriction rules out investment from HPH in Colombia, the restriction 
would not rule out investment from COSCO Pacific, since COSCO Pacific entered two 
out of four foreign port JVs with only a 20 percent stake. However, the condition that is 
unfavorable to COSCO Pacific with regard to investment in the ports in Colombia is due 
to the type of port management company it is. Since COSCO Pacific is an ocean carrier 
type port management company it bases its investment activity largely on where 
                                                 
386 Robert Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: the Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 200. 
387 “General Information,” The Constitution of Integral Port Administrations, Port of Manzanillo, 
accessed December 9, 2010, http://www.puertomanzanillo.com.mx/php/eng/seccion-
01.php?eCodSeccion=20207. 
388 President Uribe (2002–2010) visited China in 2005 to promote investment from China. Alejandro 
Kenny. “China’s Presence in Latin America: A View on Security from the Southern Cone,” Military 
Review 86, no. 5 (September, 2006): 62. 
389 Juan Gaviria, “Port Privatization and Competition in Colombia,” Public Policy for the Public 
Sector, Note No. 167 (December 1998): 1–2, accessed November 29, 2010, 
http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/biblio/docelec/bm/ppps/N167.pdf. 
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COSCON has significant trade routes. Colombian ports are not a part of COSCONs 
significant trade routes; they are barely a part of their trade routes at all.  
Drawing from the Chinese coping mechanisms for Chinese companies surviving 
in the harsh economic environment overseas as outlined under Chinese foreign 
investment in Chapter IV, Colombia would not provide the investment opportunity 
conducive to a Chinese company looking to eventually take full control of a port in 
Colombia since foreign private investment is limited by law to 30 percent. We see no 
apparent Chinese investment, even by a small private investor. On the other hand both 
Mexican and Ecuadoran ports would provide an investment environment conducive for a 
Chinese private company to enter into a joint-venture in the port sharing control of the 
port. Then, once the business was established and was experienced enough to do business 
successfully locally in Mexico or Ecuador, the Chinese company would have the option 
to acquire a larger stake in the port, with full control potentially. In gaining full control of 
the port the investor would be able to make the decisions to satisfy the objectives of the 
company—without having to take into consideration other stake holders—investing in 
projects of choice to increase their presence in the local market.
390
. This is what we 
expect from HPH or COSCO and have seen in their entrance into foreign markets earlier 
in this chapter.  
There are a few exceptions to note specific to answering the questions of where a 
Chinese port investment company will invest. If Ecuadorian and Mexican ports provide a 
favorable environment for a Chinese port investor looking to invest overseas, then why 
do we not see COSCO investment in Mexico or Ecuador? To answer this question we 
have to look at the port investment strategies expected from the specific type of company 
that COSCO is.  
                                                 
390 Li Zhaoxi “China’s Go Global Policy,” in Chinese Multinationals, ed. Jean-Paul Larçon 
(Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2009), 69. Due to the nature of port management if an entity is in 
control of the port management venture, it’s in essence in control of the whole port. There are exceptions. 
A country’s government could decide that the foreign entity is a risk to its sovereignty or not fulfilling its 
contract and remove the foreign entity, but for the most part, the foreign entity is left to run the port as it 
sees fit for business.  
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In chapter II port management companies were defined by their method of entry 
into the port management market. We described HPH as a “pure” port management 
company and we described COSCO as an ocean carrier port management company. 
COSCO Pacific has not invested in Ecuadorian or Mexican ports because COSCON does 
not have a main trade route using any of the ports in Mexico nor Ecuador. Instead, 
COSCO Pacific has ports in Panama which serve the main COSCON routes than run 
from East Asia to the East Coast of the United States by way of the Panama Canal. 
From 1995 to 1998, HPH had significant acquisitions around the world, namely 
two ports in Panama, one port in the Bahamas and three in the UK. According to the 
article, “China is still on a Buying Spree,” HPH “aggressively pursuing acquisitions 
around the world as part of a drive by the HWL group to increase greatly the non-Asian 
portion of its revenues by the year 2000.” 391 
Again, according to Meridith in an interview, HPH’s business strategy is to 
compete for concessions at “large gateway ports where it can increase its volumes 
quickly.” Meridith gave the purchase—in 2001—of the Philippines based port 
management company International Container Services Incorporated (ICTSI) 
International Holdings Corp. (IIHC), the overseas port development and holding 
subsidiary of ICTSI, and subsequently the purchase of the ports under its management at 
the time, as an example of a “big injection, both geo-graphically and in terms of 
throughput,” stating purchase included concessions at Karachi, Dar es Salaam, Ensenada, 
and Laem Chabang.392 
In explaining HPH’s expansion from Hong Kong into mainland China, Meridith 
explains, “in line with the forces of a free market, Hong Kong operators have followed 
the migration of manufacturers into China. We simply follow the market.”393 Meridith 
stated that since shippers tend to want to move their product the shortest distance 
                                                 
391 “China Still on a Buying Spree,” Asia Pacific Update, Acquisition Monthly (September 1998): 27. 
392 “Quiet, Giant Steps,” Containerisation International: TERMINAL, 2006, 60. 
393 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 
Internationalisation: The Case of the Container Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics 9 (2007): 
15. 
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possible, the shift to the mainland was necessary to be a viable option to shippers.394 
HPH has the flexibility as well as the obligation to follow the market as a “pure” port 
terminal manger in order to stay viable.395 Conversely, carrier terminal managers are 
dependent on where the trade routes of their parent company are. In the case mentioned 
above, COSCO Pacific would also like move into mainland China since it is likely the 
COSCON would adjust its trade routes for the shift in location of manufactures 
consequently shifting the customer—the shipper—to mainland China. 
The difference though is a company like HPH can attempt to predict where the 
market will shift to, or create a new market and branch into a new location relatively 
quickly. A company like COSCO Pacific could also anticipate a change in the market, or 
an emerging market and seek to branch out into that market, but it is not as likely 
COSCO Pacific would enter a new port prior to COSCON establishing a trade route 
which naturally delays any expansion. This is indicated to in a press release by COSCO 
Pacific stating it will continue to increase its investments in key overseas hub ports taking 
any opportunity that the global expansion of the container terminal industry presents, “on 
the back of the expanding container shipping fleet of COSCON and the enhanced 
partnerships with other major shipping liners in its terminal investment portfolio.”396 
The answer then as to why China invested in the Latin American ports of Ecuador 
and Mexico, and not in the ports of Colombia can be found in the alignment of how 
Ecuador and Mexico allowed private foreign investment in its ports with how Chinese 
companies invested abroad which was incompatible with how Colombia allowed 
investment in its ports. Ecuador and Mexico opened to foreign investment in a way that 
the Hutchison Port Holdings port management company found it conducive to invest in 
Ecuador and in Mexico and therefore invested in Ecuadoran and Mexican ports in the 
                                                 
394 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 
Internationalisation: The Case of the Container Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics 9 (2007): 
15. 
395 Daniel Olivier, Francesco Parola, Brian Slack and James J. Wang, “The Time Scale of 
Internationalisation: The Case of the Container Port Industry,” Maritime Economics & Logistics 9 (2007): 
15. 
396 “Capt. Wei and the King of Belgium Attend the Terminal Opening Ceremony in Antwerp,” 
Company News, Media Center, COSCO Pacific, July 06, 2005, 
http://www.coscopac.com.hk/en/news.php?class_id=16&id=181&action=content. 
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early 2000s. On the other hand Colombia restricted its opening to foreign investment in a 
way that Hutchison Port Holdings port management company did not find it conducive to 
invest in Colombian ports in the 2000s, nor did any other Chinese port management 
company. 
A. IMPLICATIONS 
While the determining factor of where to invest may be based on business 
strategy aligning with openness to investment, the potential strategic benefits turn out to 
be more important than just business. Ports are central to maritime transportation and 
most trade in the world is done through maritime transportation. Latin American ports 
have opened to private and foreign investment and consequently have potentially opened 
to the deterioration of its national sovereignty, U.S. interests in the region, and 
international trade flows and the global economy. Investment by a Chinese company in 
Latin American ports can be detrimental because of the potential coercive leverage 
private entities holding a controlling stake in a port as is the case of the ports in focus for 
this thesis. The question of who is in control of a port is important in that the actor in 
control of maritime infrastructure can make decisions beneficial to the company and/or 
parent country of the company in control of the infrastructure but detrimental to trade 
flows which ultimately has an effect on both regional economies as well as economies 
around the globe. 
Beginning with Colombia, a lack of Chinese investment in its ports should not be 
automatically deemed positive or a negative. A close look at the reasoning for the lack of 
Chinese investment in Colombian ports reveals the intention of the Colombian 
Government to retain a controlling stake in its ports, viewed as strategically important. 
However, in retaining a controlling stake in its ports, the Colombian Government has the 
responsibility not only to operate its ports to support the strategic goals of the country; it 
also has the responsibility to ensure the ports are being run effectively and efficiently in 
order to support economic growth through trade. 
According to Holms, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Curtin, “foreign investment is an 
independent market-driven indicator of confidence in the long-term growth potential of 
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the country. For Colombia to grow, private sector and foreign investment must increase 
so that opportunities for the labor force are created.”397 Today, 83 percent of the stock of 
Sociedad Portuaria Regional de Buenaventura—that operates the largest terminal on 
Colombia’s Pacific coast—is privately owned and belongs to businessmen comprised of 
importers, exporters, port operators, shipping lines, unions, former port workers and 
individuals. The remaining 17% is in the hands of the public sector consisting of the 
Buenaventura’s Mayor’s Office and the Ministries of Transportation and Agriculture.398 
Of the private investment, foreign investment includes investment from ICTSI, PSA and 
DP World. Specifically, ICTSI, through ICTSI Limited agreed on the development of a 
new container terminal in the Port of Buenaventura in July 2007.399 In 2009, DP World 
acquired a 19 percent stake in Sociedad Portuaria Regional de Buenaventura for U.S. 
$150 million with the intention to buy up to 23 percent.400 
They point out however, “Another long-term challenge to growth is the lack of 
transportation infrastructure… Resources used to fight the guerrilla conflict and combat 
illegal drugs are not being used to improve infrastructure. Without infrastructure 
development, the potential for growth is further hampered.”401 The private—to include 
foreign—investment is needed to modernize the transportation infrastructure in ports. 
Though private and foreign investment is present in Colombian ports, it is apparently not 
enough. With increased private and foreign participation, three effects can potentially 
result. As mentioned above, with increased private sector and foreign investment come 
the opportunities for the labor force. Secondly, rather than funding necessary 
infrastructure improvements at ports, the public sector can use those funs instead on its 
                                                 
397 Jennifer Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 46. 
398 “History,” Sociedad Portuaria Regional de Buenaventura SA, Corporate Information, accessed 
November 8, 2014, http://www.sprbun.com/informacion-corporativa/corporativa/historia.php. 
399 “Sociedad Puerto Industrial del Aguadulce S.A, Aguadulce, Colombia,” International Container 
Services International, Limited, accessed November, 8, 2014, http://www.ictsi.com/operations/sociedad-
puerto-industrial-del-aguadulce-s-a-spia-aguadulce-colombia/. 
400 Michele Labrut, “DP World takes 19% Stake in Colombian Terminal for $150m,” SeaTrade 
Global, July 2013, 15, http://www.seatrade-global.com/news/americas/dp-world-takes-19-stake-in-
colombian-terminal-for-$150m.html. 
401 Jennifer Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M Curtin, Guns, Drugs, and 
Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 2009), 46. 
 116 
security problems. And thirdly, once the infrastructure is improved there is potential for 
increase shipping traffic through the port which could mean an increase in revenue and an 
improvement in the Colombian economy in general.  
Turning to Ecuador, in February 2010, HPH’s TIDE withdrew from the project to 
develop the Port of Manta on which it had already spent U.S. $20 million, “on the 
grounds that there are changes in the concession agreement, unilaterally imposed by the 
Ecuadorian Government, which TIDE finds unacceptable.” 402 President Correa made 
claims that TIDE had fallen behind schedule in the project.403 Manta Port Authority 
(APM) took over running the project.404 TIDE explained that other foreign companies 
experienced difficulties with the Ecuadorian Government, namely Chevron Texas (US), 
Repsol (of Spain), Interagua (of the UK), Agip (based in Italy) and the Brazilian based 
construction firm Odebrecht.405 One source was quoted saying “Overall, I guess you 
could say there have been faults on both sides of this heated and aggressive argument, but 
as an Ecuadorian I worry about our image in the eyes of international investors.” 
To date, the Port of Manta is offering a concession for the development of the 
Port of Manta. The tendering process for the Port of Manta was launched in 2012, the 
first following the failed concession involving HPH, but cancelled when none of the nine 
companies to acquire the tender rules submitted bids. 406 Rules were acquired by the 
following companies: Peru’s Logiran and Andino Investment Holding, Chile’s Ultramar 
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Extended,” BN Americas, February 6, 2014, http://www.bnamericas.com/news/privatization/ecuadors-
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and Empresas Navieras, Spain’s Acciona, Colombia’s Grupo Odinsa, The U.S.’ Ports 
America, and Venezuela’s Geohidra consultores and consortium Clover-Vialpa.407 
A new tendering process for the U.S. $951 million concession to expand and 
operate Port of Manta was launched in 2013. 408 The 37-year concession consists of 
expanding Manta into a deepwater port with a 16.2m draft and a minimum capacity of 
9Mt by 2051. 409 Eight companies registered to participate in the onsite visit that APM 
carried out in December 2013 these companies were then required to submit 
prequalification documentation by February 3 with APM set to announce prequalified 
firms on February 21. 410 But following a request for more time from interested 
companies, APM has extended the deadline to February 28.411  
Further, based on an OAS competitiveness study of Ecuadorian ports, 
“politicization of the ports, the lack of technology and the competition with other South 
American ports (Peru and Chile) has caused restrains in the port development of 
Ecuador.”412 This indicates that what Ecuador is doing in terms of managing its ports is 
not working. Based on APMs re-attempt at offering the Port of Manta up for concession 
again, it seems that they recognize the need for private investment. And based off the 
companies that have shown interest there is a potential for foreign in the ports as well. 
Considering Ecuador’s historical altercations with foreign private investors in Ecuador 
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both the Ecuadorian Government and any potential foreign investors can benefit from 
such foreign direct investment should they be able to come to an agreement mutually 
beneficial and both adhere to what was agreed to. 
And finally of the case countries, so far the effects seen in Mexico as a result of 
HPHs investment in the main ports in Mexico have not only been positive but have been 
much more pronounced in a shorter period of time than expected. Reports of such rapid 
progress include:  
Few shipping industry observers expected Mexico’s ports to achieve so 
much so quickly. Less than two years ago, they watched and waited for 
government talks about privatization to spring into action. Now, these 
same observers see the remarkable progress. Change has engulfed 
Mexico’s main container ports faster than anyone could predict. Two 
major terminal operators moved into Mexico, navigating vest 
opportunities for port development, and expansion took off.  
New rail connections have been built, providing smooth flow for transport 
of goods to and from the ports. And more plans are in motion to make the 
rail connections even bigger and better. The result: a more efficient and 
productive port system that gives U.S. gateways a run for their money. 
‘The improvements in Mexican ports have been substantial,’ said Rex 
Sherman, director of research and information services at the American 
Association of Port Authorities in Alexandria, Va. The ports are ‘no 
longer prisoners of a political bureaucracy. They are put in a state where 
they can function like businesses and are encouraged to compete.413 
It is important that the Government of Mexico ensure that the FDI in its ports are 
within a framework of foreign policy that do not allow its country to be stripped of 
natural resources to satiate China’s continue need for natural resources and protect its 
workers from being put out of a job due to competition from China, especially as a result 
of the success of the HPH controlled ports.  
Turning to U.S. interests in Latin America, Chinese hard and soft power in Latin 
America—hard power exhibited by port direct investment—has increased in a region 
traditionally dominated by U.S. influence. It is also important that the Government of the 
413 Susan Kreimer, “Arriba! Mexican Ports Enjoy An Infusion of Investment That Should Ensure 
Rapid Growth,” Journal of Commerce no. 38: (2003): 84. The two major terminal operators referred to in 
this quote are HPH and SSA Marine Incorporated. 
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U.S. to maintain and improve relations with Mexico, both economically and politically 
speaking to help ensure port use coincides with regional interests, as well as national 
interests and global interests.  
FDI specifically from HPH, Li Ka-Ching—HPH’s owner—spent roughly U.S. 
$1.5 billion buying 15 shipping container terminals 2000 to 2004. In 2004, HPH was the 
world’s largest shipping container business in the world with a presence in 32 ports in 15 
countries.414 In 2004, more than 40 percent of all containers shipped from China left 
from an HPH terminal. In the same year, Li was the biggest foreign investor in the 
Bahamas.415 Li’s 1997 investment in the port operations in the cruise ship facility and 
container port led to his purchase of the Grand Bahama airport.416 Also in 1997, HPH 
won the concession to operate the ports located at each end of the Panama Canal, the 
ports of Cristobal and Balboa.417  
In 2004, Li did not have investments in any U.S. port. 418 Lee in Forbes explains, 
“That’s because U.S. ports are owned by the government, and Li is not interested in 
competing in countries where the government has such a dominant role.” 419 She further 
states that not having a presence in the U.S. is very expensive considering that 80 percent 
of Li’s cargo is bound for the U.S. market.420 However, COSCO has been jointly 
operating a terminal in the Port of Long Beach in Southern California since July 1, 2001.  
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The JV between COSCO and SSA is called Pacific Maritime Services, LLC (PMS) and is 
owned by both COSCO Terminal America and SSA. COSCO holds 51 percent of the 
shares, and SSA shares 49 percent.  
While China’s presence in Latin America cannot automatically be determined a 
“threat” to U.S. interests U.S. policy with respect to China’s presence in the Western 
Hemisphere “should focus on ensuring that China acts as a responsible stakeholder that 
contributes to the region’s economic prosperity while respecting the democratic 
principles that are the guiding values of the Inter-American system.”421 The terminal 
operator SSA Marine incorporated mentioned as a major terminal operator in Mexico’s 
main ports is an example of how the U.S. needs to stay involved in Mexico. 
And finally, what are the implications of Chinese investment in Latin American 
ports to the world? With the increase in Chinese hard and soft power in Latin America 
political relationships are also being strengthened in parallel with economic relationships. 
Stefan Halper points out“ 
Over the past decade and a half, while few in the West were paying 
attention, Beijing has built a coalition of countries…that can be trusted to 
vote China’s way in an increasingly clogged alphabet soup of international 
fora. It’s a bloc reminiscent of the one the Soviet Union assembled during 
the Cold War, though focused on economic and trade advantages, not 
security issues...422 
He goes on to explain how Chinese officials do not hesitate to use soft power 
coercively. He gives examples of ambassadors from African and Asia who have 
unofficially stated that China uses aid and trade to coerce them against U.S. initiatives, 
putting their economic projects in jeopardy if they do not comply.423 Militarily speaking, 
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he states, it is not a goal of China to challenge the West, or even economically speaking, 
for now, due to the economic interdependence between China and the U.S. and 
Europe.424 According to Stefan Halper, 
But we shouldn’t dismiss China’s efforts as merely a sophisticated reprise 
of the Soviet Union’s failed bid for the loyalties of the global south. China 
is a capitalist dynamo, not a creaking autarky, and its market-authoritarian 
example is fast winning adherents around the world—while marginalizing 
the values that have informed Western progress for 300 years. 425  
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APPENDIX EXAMPLES OF COSCON SHIPPING ROUTES  
 
Figure 10.  COSCON Transpacific Service426 
                                                 
426 “AWE1 Service,” Transpacific Services, Asia/USEC & Gulf of Mexico& Central America Services, Our Services, Service Map, COSCO Container 
Lines Company Limited, accessed November 8, 2014, http://www.coscon.com/ourservice/servicepdf/EN/AWE1.pdf. 
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Figure 11.  COSCON Feeder Service427 
                                                 
427 “Feeder Services via Piraeus,” European Trade Services, Asia/Mediterranean Services, Our Services, Service Map, COSCO Container Lines Company 
Limited, accessed November 8, 2014, http://www.coscon.com/ourservice/servicepdf/EN/AFS.pdf. 
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Figure 12.  COSCON Asia-Med Service428 
                                                 




Figure 13.  COSCON Transpacific Services Gulf of Mexico Service429 
                                                 
429 “Gulf of Mexico Service, Transpacific Services, Asia/USEC & Gulf of Mexico& Central America Services, Our Services, Service Map, COSCO 
Container Lines Company Limited, accessed November 8, 2014, http://www.coscon.com/ourservice/servicepdf/EN/GME.pdf. 
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Figure 14.  COSCON Europe Trade Services430 
                                                 
430 “TAE Service” Europe Trade Services, Transatlantic Services, Our Services, Service Map, COSCO Container Lines Company Limited, accessed 
November 8, 2014, http://www.coscon.com/ourservice/servicepdf/EN/TAS1.pdf. 
 128 
 
Figure 15.  COSCON WSA North South Services431 
                                                 
431 “WSA Service,” North-South Services, Asia/South American Services, Our Services, Service Map, COSCO Container Lines Company Limited, 
accessed November 8, 2014, http://www.coscon.com/ourservice/servicepdf/EN/WSA.pdf. 
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